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The number of automobile recalls in the U.S. has sharply increased in the last 2 decades, and the number of units 
involved are often counted in the millions. In 2010 alone, over 20 million vehicles were recalled in the United States, 
and the massive recalls of full model lines by Toyota have brought this issue to the front pages around the country and 
the world. However, there is no quantitative evidence of the effect of recalls on safety. Without that evidence, the 
government and insurance companies have been reluctant to request and use more detailed recall information to 
increase correction rates, and regulators have not studied the possible link between the growing number of recalls and 
the risk of life for consumers. In this paper we empirically quantify the effect of vehicle recalls on safety using 
repeated cross-sections on accidents of individual drivers and aggregate vehicle recall data, to construct synthetic 
panel data on individual drivers of a particular vehicle model. We estimate the effect of recalls on the number of 
accidents and find that a 10 percent increase in the recall rate of a particular model reduces the accidents of that model 
by between 0.78 percent and 1.6 percent when using the full sample of accidents in our data. We also find that recalls 
classified as “hazardous” are more effective in reducing accidents and the recall effect is especially strong when we 
restrict attention to accidents that lead to personal injuries and only include vehicles more likely to be at fault for the 
accident, but much less so for accidents that only lead to property damage. We also find that vehicle models with 
recalls with higher correction rates have on average fewer accidents in the years following a recall, which indicates the 
importance of the role of drivers’ behavior regarding recalls on safety. Our findings suggest that policymakers should 
consider, for example, policies to allow insurance companies to take into account recall correction behavior when 
pricing auto insurance, which could be made possible through regulatory changes by the U.S. government, and should 
revisit the complex trade-offs between pre- and post-market regulation in this important industry. 
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The recall system for motor vehicles in the U.S. was first introduced in 1966 to solve potential 
safety problems and to remove unsafe and dangerous vehicles from the roads.
1 Between 1966 and 
2009, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and manufacturers have 
issued more than 15,063 recalls, and the campaigns have been more active in recent years, 
especially since 1990. More than 19 million vehicles were recalled in 2003, accounting for about 8 
percent of U.S. registered vehicles, compared to 5 percent in 1993 (Power & Lundegaard, 2004). 
According to the NHTSA, the total number of vehicles recalled increased by 61 percent during 
2004 to an all-time high of over 30 million vehicles. Since then the number of recalls has 
somewhat declined, but during 2009 over 16.4 million vehicles were recalled, and more than 20 
million were recalled during 2010.
2 Furthermore, the recent massive recalls by Toyota, which 
have included full product lines and over 6 million vehicles (in the U.S. alone), have brought the 
issue to the front pages around the globe, and have prompted some to suggest the need for the 
government to better regulate the vehicles that manufacturers put on the road. Little is known, 
however, about the effect of vehicle recalls on the number of accidents, and there has been no 
quantitative analysis of this link. This link is one of the keys in the policy arena because if the 
research we present here finds that recalls have an effect on safety, it means that the number of 
unsafe cars on the road has an effect on the safety of drivers and should be a concern to 
policymakers. 
The arguments regarding the likely effects of vehicle recall on safety problems mainly have 
come from the manufacturers and the regulatory agents. The NHTSA states that its combined 
efforts (including recall campaigns, traditional safety regulations, education on safety driving, 
increase in road safety investment) result in a decrease in accidental harm, but quantitative 2 
 
evidence is hard to come by. Experts who are in favor of solutions by automotive engineering 
insist that one of the main determinants of the safety problem is the drivers’ behavior. Evans (2002) 
divides the main determinants of safety into two categories: driver behavior and engineering, 
including recalls. He argues that even though people pay a great deal of attention to the drivers’ 
behavior, more focus still goes to crash-test ratings, product-liability trials, and product recalls. He 
says that this is misplaced and overemphasized. He also insists that misplaced focus on vehicle 
factors has encouraged American drivers to regard safety as something out of their control, and the 
focus on safety equipment, such as airbags, misleads U.S. drivers into the belief that safety can be 
achieved without action on their part (see Peltzman, 1975, for the seminal work on this argument, 
and Hause, 2006, for a recent theoretical discussion.). He suggests that policies that can change 
drivers’ behavior or improve road environments are more desirable for safety because recalls do 
not save any lives. However, he acknowledges that quantitative evidence supporting this latter 
conclusion has not been developed.
3 Similarly, McDonald (2006) argues that there is over-recall, 
implying that recalls have little effect on safety, but he doesargue in favor of some of the 
regulatory policy suggestions we discuss to increase correction rates. However, no empirical 
analysis of any kind is presented in the book to defend any of the arguments put forward. Our study 
provides an empirically based framework where it is possible to quantify the effects of recalls on 
safety.
4 
There are a number of reasons why there are relatively few studies of the effect of recalls on 
safety. First, recalls are specific to particular vehicle models, which means that each recall is 
issued for the stock of particular vehicle models that are in use on the road at a particular point in 
time. When the government or manufacturers find a defect that might cause serious accidents for 
the particular year models, they have to decide whether or not a recall has to be issued and, if they 3 
 
do, how many units should be included. Recalls are often heterogeneous because each defective 
unit that might cause accidents has a different risk level. Therefore, the decision on whether to 
recall a vehicle, the scope, and the range of the defective parts are quite different according to the 
seriousness of the defects of the models. In addition to these problems, some recall data, such as 
recall costs, are not available to researchers. And there is no direct link between recall data, 
accident data and vehicle information, so researchers need to construct this link themselves. 
We use a methodology that groups individual drivers by types to produce synthetic panel data 
to analyze the effect of recalls on the number of accidents. Meanwhile we control for the inherent 
unobserved heterogeneity of drivers, which is likely to matter a lot in explaining who gets into an 
accident, which could confound the results in a purely cross-sectional framework.
5 The results 
show that recalls reduce the number of accidents. Specifically, recalls of a particular model reduce 
accidents of that model by between 7.8 percent and 16 percent. Which means that a 10 percent 
increase on the recall rate of a particular model will reduce the accidents of that model by 0.8 
percent to 1.6 percent. Recalls classified as “hazardous” are more effective, and the recall effect is 
especially strong on the number of accidents linked to injuries, a result robust to restricting 
attention to the vehicles likely to be responsible for the accident. Our findings should not be 
understood as suggesting that more recalls (on top of the hundreds of recalls of millions of cars 
already issued every year) would be beneficial, in fact, as we discuss further below, we hope our 
findings foster a discussion of the trade-offs of the pre- and post-market safety and quality 
screening in the automobile industry, given that the effectiveness of recalls in terms of the numbers 
of accidents (and also severity) suggest that additional ex-ante safety controls could be beneficial 
to society. 
We also find that vehicle models with recalls with higher correction rates have, other things 4 
 
equal, fewer accidents in the 3 years after the recall, indicating the importance of the role of drivers’ 
behavior, regarding recalls, on safety. The latter suggests that society as a whole, individual 
drivers, and insurance companies could benefit from an initiative to take into account correction 
rates of outstanding and past recalls of the drivers’ vehicles when pricing auto insurance. 
Official communications between the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) and the 
NHTSA suggest that it is realistic to believe that this use of the recall information will materialize 
in the near future. Insurance companies, through the IIHS, have already started to pressure the 
government to release more information about recalls, such that it is possible to have the Vehicle 
Identification Numbers (VIN) of the vehicles recalled. This would allow a better monitoring of 
who fixes their cars and open the door for insurance companies to take it into account in their 
pricing strategies. In a letter written in November of 2001, the Senior Vice President of the IIHS 
petitioned the NHTSA to require manufacturers to include the VIN numbers of the vehicles 
recalled in their recall announcements. This would reverse a decision of the NHTSA of 1986, 
which accepted a petition by manufacturers to drop this requirement, which had been in place 
since 1974. As of the completion of our research this petition is still pending, but if granted, our 
results suggest that the likely increase in correction rates would have a welfare improving effect by 
reducing accidents.
6 
There are two additional important ways in which public policy can play an important role on 
these issues. First, a number of legislators have been trying to change certain policies to foster 
correction rates and information flows to consumers regarding recalls. In early 2005, the 
California State Senator Debra Bowen (D-Redondo Beach, who is now California’s Secretary of 
State), introduced a bill (SB 114) that would require the Department of Motor Vehicles, when it 
provides a notice of registration renewal for a vehicle that is subject to a recall, to also notify the 5 
 
registered owner that the vehicle is the subject of a manufacturer’s safety-related recall and 
provide the vehicle recall information. While the bill passed the committee stage and the Senate, it 
was never implemented. The state senator’s office told us that the American car manufacturers 
were against the measure and considered it quite unfortunate that a simple regulation likely to have 
an important effect on taking faulty vehicles off the road is not implemented mainly due to the the 
lack of evidence on its advantages.
7 Notice that the latter is the key, given the cost to 
manufacturers of a sharp increase in correction rates, with little evidence that this will have any 
meaningful effect on the safety of drivers and passengers.
8 
The other important, and probably more far reaching, issue in which public policy can play a 
role comes from the fact that for years (if not decades) manufacturers have apparently felt 
relatively little pressure to minimize the problems of cars before they are put on the road, since the 
direct and indirect costs to society of the increasing number of recalls (and the accidents linked to 
them) seem to be small compared with the likely investments (and loss of revenue due to delays in 
introducing new models in an ever more competitive, and increasingly complex, industry) needed 
to reduce defects to a level that would assure a small number of recalls and prevent accidents. The 
latter is naturally related to the issue of optimal pre-market testing in a given industry and the 
likelihood of observing errors in the screening process by the regulator, which has considerable 
tradition in the regulatory literature.
9 
The idea is that the optimal pre-market testing results from minimizing the total cost to society 
of implementing this testing. The total cost is a function, on the one hand, of the costs to the 
manufacturers (private costs) to test for vehicle defects, and the costs associated with delaying the 
introduction of better and safer vehicles, which are an increasing function of the pre-market testing. 
On the other hand, the total cost is also a function of the expected cost (social cost) for society of 6 
 
allowing unsafe cars to be marketed, which could also include the additional private costs to 
manufacturers of fixing faulty vehicles (induced by post-market regulation), and be influenced by 
possible behavioral responses to pre-market regulation that would put very safe cars on the road, 
leading drivers to be less careful on the roads (Peltzman, 1975). Overall this second set of costs is 
likely to decrease in pre-market testing, but in general it is more difficult to estimate than the costs 
from performing pre-market tests (especially the social cost component, which is unlikely to be 
internalized by profit-maximizing manufacturers except through very tough post-market 
regulation. The latter way of making producers internalize the externality might be inefficient 
under uncertainty, as discussed by Kolstad, Ulen, & Johnson, 1990). In fact, our research can be 
understood as trying to link the possible effectiveness of the current post-market regulation of the 
automobile market, to the slope of the declining cost function to society associated with 
pre-market testing. The reason for this link is that if recalls are effective in reducing accidents it is 
likely that the current pre-market testing is at a lower level than socially optimal, due the fact that it 
is believed (without much empirical evidence, or due to lack thereof) that some of the costs 
associated with putting unsafe cars on the road (the social part of these costs) might not be 
declining in the pre-testing efforts after a certain relatively low level of pre-testing. 
The connection between pre-market testing and market outcomes has produced important 
recent contributions (Carpenter & Ting, 2005; 2007; Carpenter, Grimmer, & Lomazoff, 2009). 
The latter literature connects pre-market screening with likely errors in terms of the quality of 
products put in the market, modeling the process as a game of incomplete information between 
manufacturers and the regulator, which fits well with the structure of the automobile industry. One 
interesting result of the last set of authors indicates that under plausible assumptions a reliable 
quality screening process (even if it leads to few actual improvements in safety or quality) could 7 
 
lead to more confidence in the product by consumers and therefore higher sales. These results 
suggest that even car manufacturers could benefit from a careful revamping of the pre-market 
screening of vehicles, even if they believe the effects on the average safety and quality of cars put 
on the road is unlikely to be affected in a significant way. Another even more relevant result of this 
literature is that if the pre-market experimentation with the new products is short (as is the case 
with new vehicles given the market pressure to put new models on the road) the approval of 
unreliable products introduced by larger firms increases, which again seems to be in line with the 
events we have seen in the automobile industry in the last years. 
Clearly, given the incredibly high number of recalls during the 1990s and the first decade of 
the new centuryin the last years, it is becoming imperative for policymakers to consider whether a 
deeper reform of the automobile industry’s quality control process is necessary. The very pressure 
to produce more and newer cars (as discussed by Johnson, 2010, and McDuffie & Fujimoto, 2010, 
and implicitly acknowledged by Toyota’s CEO in front of Congress when he said “I have 
personally placed the highest priority on improving quality over quantity, and I have shared that 
direction with our stakeholders”), coupled with an apparently lenient system to control what 
manufacturers put on the roads, has lead to situations in which measures are only implemented 
when loss of life or property has already occurred. This pre- vs. post-market screening of safety 
and quality of vehicles system must be revisited, and our work tries to contribute in the direction of 
showing that the problems for which cars are recalled are serious. Removing recalled cars from the 
road has real effects, which suggests that not having them on the road on the first place would be a 
much better outcome for drivers and society as a whole. If the post-market actions reduce the cost 
to society proxied by the decline in the number of accidents that lead to injuries and property 
damage, it means additional pre-market testing could have prevented some accidents. From the 8 
 
point of view of manufacturers it is likely too costly to have a system of quality control so effective 
that a very small number of defective cars are put on the road. However, what seems clear is that 
the current system in which over 15 million vehicles are recalled every year is consistent with a 
policy in which the cost of testing the performance of vehicles is in part passed on to consumers 
instead of quality control engineers, and maybe leading to less trust in the products put on the road 
resulting in lower likelihood of buying more products.
10 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section provides an overview 
of the recall system in the United States and a short review of the related literature. The third 
section describes the data. The fourth section discusses the econometric models we estimate. The 
fifth section presents the empirical results, and the sixth section offers concluding remarks and 
discusses the policy implications of our results. 
 
BACKGROUND ON THE RECALL SYSTEM AND THE RELATED LITERATURE 
Definitions and the Recall Process 
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act gives the NHTSA the authority to require 
manufacturers to recall vehicles with safety-related defects that could cause loss of vehicle control 
such as steering, braking, fire, or repeated stalling. The NHTSA sets a Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standard to regulate vehicles so that manufacturers have to comply with the standard in 
order to sell their vehicles in the market. Even if they comply with the standard, if serious 
accidents occur or are expected because of potential defects, then a recall is required. 
Recalls may be either voluntary or mandatory. The government gives manufacturers the 
opportunity to announce recalls voluntarily. If the manufacturers do not agree with the 
government’s recall decision, they can resolve the disputes in the courts. While this does not seem 9 
 
to happen very often in some cases, it has delayed the recall process considerably. Tobin (1982) 
already discussed the negotiations that occurr between manufacturers and the governments 
regarding recall details, given the costs attached to having to fix potentially millions of cars. 
Regarding the owners of the vehicles, the NHTSA releases information on how to complain when 
owners think that their vehicles have any safety-related problem. When they are injured in 
accidents, and think that their injuries are due to those problems, they are asked to file a defect 
report directly to the NHTSA. Alternatively, they may report the problems to the manufacturers. 
After recalls are issued, they have to take their vehicles to the places assigned by the manufacturers 
to be repaired. 
The whole recall process is lengthy.
11 For example, a Firestone tire recall that affected some 
Ford vehicles took more than 7 years from the first report until they reached a final decision. There 
are many steps before a final decision to recall vehicles is made. Manufacturers may begin their 
initial recall process once they find some safety-related defects, even if there have been no 
complaint reports from their customers. This decision can be made based on their own 
investigative activities, given that they regularly monitor the quality of the vehicles. However, it is 
vital for either manufacturers or the regulatory agents to receive the complaint reports from the 
owners to begin the recall process. After a recall issuance, it also takes time to finish all corrective 
procedures because it depends upon the vehicle owners. The NHTSA requires manufacturers to 
report the correction rates quarterly. On average, more than 40 percent of owners have not taken 
any corrective action (on vehicle recalls) by the first 18 months. 
The first step of the process, which is taken by the regulatory agency, is known as “screening.” 
Once all the information from the reports is entered into a database, technical staff at the Office of 
Defects Investigation (ODI) of the NHTSA look at the complaints and check if there is any trend in 10 
 
accidents. If the trend shows an increasing risk of accidents, then the NHTSA starts an 
investigation. 
The next step is called “petition analysis.” However, this does not always follow screening 
because any person can submit a petition to the NHTSA. For example, an owner who had a serious 
injury from an accident can write a petition to the NHTSA, when he or she believes that there may 
have been some defects in the vehicle that may have played a role in causing the accident. The role 
of the NHTSA is then to decide whether the petition is accepted or denied. Once it is accepted, 
more detailed investigation is conducted. In the final stage before recall issuance, the ODI sends a 
notice to manufacturers to give them an opportunity to argue against it or provide new evidence. 
Manufacturers can issue a recall at any of the stages, which makes the recall voluntary. If the 
manufacturers do not recall, then the NHTSA investigates further. If the govern ment experts find 
the safety standard has been violated, the government agency contacts the manufacturer who starts 
the recall process. In rare occasions the manufacturers fight the decision of the government and 
bring the issue to court. 
Once recalls are announced, the manufacturers send notice letters to their customers and also 
announce the recall through the media so that the vehicles can be brought in and the defects fixed. 
The Recall Management Division, part of the NHTSA, monitors the post-recall process. 
 
Recall Trends 
Recall data with detailed information on all individual recalls since 1966 were obtained from the 
National Center for Statistics and Analysis (NCSA), an office of the NHTSA. Although we will 
impose some restrictions in the empirical analysis due to variables not available in the last few 
years of data, we include all vehicle recalls up to 2009 in the discussion below to analyze the 11 
 
overall trends. The data include the following information on recalls of particular vehicles: model 
year, beginning and ending dates of manufacturing, potential number of units affected, potential 
number of units defective, recall initiator, the number of units corrected, hazard category (only up 
to 2001), the summaries of defects, the possible consequences, and the correction required to 
eliminate the defects. The number of units affected might be different from the number of units 
defective, since the latter is the number of units that actually have the problem, after carefully 
investigating the defects. The NHTSA assigns four different hazard ratings to each recall: A, B, C, 
and D from the highest to the lowest hazardous recalls. Even though the category B only includes 
around 5 percent of recalls, here we define the “hazard recalls” as the ones that receive high hazard 
ratings: A or B, given that many recalls in the latter category are quite serious and are clearly more 
serious than those included in the other two categories. 
Figure 1 shows that the number of recalls has increased significantly over time. In 1966, 58 
recalls were issued. In 2000 the number of recalls issued had increased to 631, and by 2008 they 
were close to 800. The increase is especially sharp since the early-mid 1990s, and the increase in 
the number of hazard recalls (only shown up to 2001 given data availability) is proportional to the 
number of all recalls. Since each recall involves a different number of units, we can plot the 
average number of units per recall over time. Figure 2 shows the annual average units per recall. 
From the 1960s and up to the late 1970s, the average number of units involved in a recall almost 
never reached 50,000, and after a couple of episodes of major recalls that trend returned. However, 
the substantial change occurred in the 1990s when the average number of units rose considerably, 
and while there has been a slight decline since then, the average number has stayed quite high. 
Additionally, the average number of units with high hazard ratings (shown up to 2001) clearly 
increased in the 1990s. 12 
 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of all total vehicles recalled initiated by domestic 
manufacturers, which up to the mid 1990s had fluctuated considerably every year moving from 
highs above 90 percent to as low as 50 percent. The end of the fluctuations has coincided with a 
sharp decline in the proportion of units recalled initiated by domestic manufacturers. This 
proportion reached a low point just above 40 percent during the first decade of the new century. In 
part this reflects the growing importance of foreign manufacturers in the U.S. car market, but also 
their push towards massive production, which some suggest might come with a lowering of their 
quality (Johnson, 2010; McDuffie & Fujimoto, 2010), reaching a pinnacle with the ongoing recalls 
by Toyota. It is interesting to emphasize that a larger proportion of the recalls issued by foreign 
manufacturers are considered hazardous compared with domestic manufacturers. It is also 
important to emphasize that in Figure 3 we are not accounting for very small manufacturers that 
recall a very small number of vehicles The recalls represented in the figure account for almost all 
the vehicles actually recalled. 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the proportion of recalled vehicles with the process initiated 
by the government and not the manufacturers. This proportion has fluctuated considerably over 
time, and since early 1990s, has consistently reached 60 percent of the vehicles recalled. Recalls 
can be quite costly for manufacturers and in some cases they seem reluctant to initiate the recall as 
they balance the cost and benefits of delaying action. Interestingly, an analysis of the proportion of 
recalls irrespective of number of vehicles involved (figure not shown), the proportion of 
mandatory recalls is never above 40 percent, and usually fluctuates between 20 percent and 30 
percent, which indicates that mandatory recalls are usually also those with large number of units 
involved. 
Tables 1 to 3 review this trends from 1988 to 2001, which is the period of our econometric 13 
 
analysis, given the data limitations in the later periods. Table 1 shows that manufacturers issued 
3,886 recalls (74.3 percent of the total), while the ODI of the NHTSA initiated 1,032 recalls (19.73 
percent) and the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) initiated the rest. 54.96 percent of 
the recalls received the highest hazard rating, while 4.62 percent and 40.16 percent of the recalls 
were assigned the second and third hazard levels, respectively. Correction rates are defined as the 
ratio of the number of units repaired to the number of units recalled during the first 6 quarters after 
the recall. We have not been able obtain data on quarterly (or monthly) correction rates because the 
manufacturers do not disclose that information. The manufacturers report data on the number of 
units repaired during the first 6 quarters to the NHTSA. The table shows that the average 
correction rate is 55 percent. This means that more than half of the units have been fixed within the 
first 18 months after the recall. 
One underlying concern with the trends we have shown is that the increase in both recall 
issuance and units per recall may result from the increase in the market size. Column 7 of Table 2 
shows that the total number of vehicles sold has followed a different pattern. The level of 15.7 
million vehicles sold in 1988 was not reached again until 1999 with 16.9 million, after a low of 
12.6 million in 1991. In 2000 17.6 million were sold, and 16.6 million were sold in 2001.
12 Sales 
during the first decade of this century fluctuated at around those figures, and the last few years 
have seen a considerable decline in vehicles sold at the same time that recall issuance has not 
shown any sign of declining. 
In line with what we saw in the figures, column 3 of Table 2 shows that the number of recalls 
from foreign vehicle manufacturers represents approximately one quarter of all recalls. This ratio 
is quite constant over time. The 4
th column of Table 2 shows who initiates the recalls. The 
proportion of recalls that are voluntary has fluctuated over time, but seems to be on the rise since 14 
 
the late 1990s, accounting for over three quarters of the recalls. 
Table 3 shows more details about recalls in 1988 to 2001. The total number of recalls from 
1988 to 2001 was 5,233. The average value of the potential number of units affected was 94,237. 
The number of units that are issued to each recall range from 1 to 32 million. The NHTSA assigns 
four different hazard ratings according to the degree of possible risk. The value is 4 (which 
corresponds to category A) if a recall receives the most hazardous rating. The lowest hazardous 
rating here is 1 (which corresponds to category D). The average value was 3.143. 
One last issue to be mentioned about the recalls is that although a recall is usually issued on a 
particular year-model, some recalls have been issued for two or more year-models. We solve this 
by grouping data on sales and correction rates for all year-models. In the cases that a given recall is 
issued to different vehicle models because they are produced from the same production line, then 
the number of units we use is divided by its share. 
 
Previous Literature 
Many researchers (e.g., Ashenfelter & Greenstone, 2004) have studied the effects of direct safety 
regulations, such as mandated speed limits, but the economics profession has not provided any 
quantitative evidence on the effects of these recalls on safety. Hoffer (1975) and Crafton, Hoffer, 
and Reilly (1981) focus on the effects of recalls on consumers’ demand for the vehicles, and 
Nichols and Foumier (1999) and more recently Rhee and Haunschild (2003) study the effects on 
manufacturers’ reputations. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) analyze the stock market’s response to the 
news of product defects. Using medical and automobile recall data, they show that the capital 
market internalizes the indirect costs of recalls and these costs are large enough to dominate direct 
recall costs.
13 However, these results were later somewhat discredited by the work of Hoffer, 15 
 
Pruitt, and Reilly (1988) showing that some changes in the construction of the recall events to 
more appropriately identify the effects lead to an important weakening (in most cases leading to 
statistical insignificance) of the original results. In any case, these costs can be a considerable 
deterrence to producing risky products, and give the manufacturers incentives to make safer 
vehicles. Rupp (2004) using more recent data, and focusing on the attributes of the recalls, finds 
results more in line with the significant results, and so do Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009) with data 
from other consumer products. Hartman (1987) assesses whether the resale market for cars 
discounts the information on recalls, and finds fairly substantial effects in terms of lower prices for 
cars that have been subject to important recalls. 
Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1994) show that recalls of domestic new model vehicles with severe 
safety defects generate the largest corrective rates. They define the rates as the ratio of the number 
of the units repaired to the number of the units issued for the vehicle model. They argue that it is 
much easier for the owners of domestic vehicles to access the designated repair shops than the 
owners of foreign vehicles because the domestic manufacturers have much more well-organized 
dealerships across the country. Therefore, the time cost is lower for the owners of domestic 
vehicles. Accordingly, domestic vehicles’ correction rates are higher. Hoffer, Pruit, and Reilly did 
not study whether these corrective rates directly affected accidents. 
Rupp and Taylor (2002) investigate the initiation of recalls. They find evidence that the 
government initiates less hazardous recalls that affect larger number of units, while the 
manufacturers issue inexpensive recalls. They also analyze the determinants of recall corrective 
actions. Again, their study does not deal directly with the safety issue. 
Huble and Arndt (1996) use car crash data to analyze how this information can be used to 
support the different positions in a safety dispute. They use a particular vehicle model (a GM truck) 16 
 
to see the effects of changing the fuel tank location on safety by comparing it with other similar 
types of trucks. They find that the conclusions might be quite different even if the manufacturer 
and the government use the same data source. This paper does not directly deal with recalls, but 
compares the damage to the vehicles and the loss of life before and after a model’s design change. 
Of course, a model’s design change can be a response to defects in order to reduce the number of 
accidents. 
Bates et al. (2007) study the trends of vehicle recalls in the United Kingdom, describing some 
common features to the U.S. car market, but do not relate their study to any measure of safety. 
 
THE DATA 
We use accident data from the General Estimation System (GES), which contains a nationally 
representative sample of all vehicle accidents that have happened based on police reports.
14 Recall 
data is available from the NHTSA, and vehicles’ sales data and information about design changes 
has been gathered from Ward’s automotive yearbook. 
The GES designates 60 areas that represent geographic and demographic regions. Every week 
data collectors visit around 400 police stations within these areas. They randomly select about 
50,000 Police Accident Reports (PAR) each year. The system started its operation in 1988, and 
data files through 2001 were, until recently, freely available online. We use the data files from 
1998 to 2001 in the econometric analysis. More recent data does not have the same level of detail 
and a number of important variables are missing, like the hazard level of the recall.
15 
These data files consist of three distinct data sets: the accident file, the vehicle/driver file, and 
the personal file. The accident file contains information describing environmental conditions and 
roadway characteristics at the time of the crash, as well as information about the severity of the 17 
 
injuries for the passengers involved. The vehicle/driver file contains information describing the 
vehicles involved in the accidents and their drivers. It includes information such as make and 
model of the car and model year of the car. The personal file contains general information 
describing all persons involved in the crash: drivers, passengers, and pedestrians. It includes 
information such as age, sex, and injury severity. 
The second source of information is obtained from Ward’s annual automotive yearbook. 
These data contain all U.S. new vehicle sales by line. These sales data will be combined with recall 
data to produce the recall variables. The third source of information contains data on recalls. In 
order to match the first two data sets, we will use recall data starting in 1988. For the empirical 
study, we will use data on the potential number of units affected, the dummy variables on the 
manufacturers, calendar year of recall, and hazard category code for each recall. 
The variables used in the empirical analysis are defined in Tables A1 and A2, in the Appendix, 
and explained below. 
 
Measuring Accidents by Driver Type 
Most literature related to safety issues uses either fatality rates or accident rates as measures of 
accidental harm. However, those rates do not fit well with our objectives. The variable we choose 
should reflect common characteristics that are specific to type of driver. Furthermore, data should 
be identified by the vehicle models because recalls do not have a geographic dimension. 
We define the types of drivers by age, gender, whether the driver was in the striking vehicle, 
and by the vehicle model. The latter has the effect of reducing the number of individuals by group 
but it captures many unobservable characteristics about the drivers, following the conjecture that 
the car that someone drives is an indicator of income, wealth, and in some cases attitudes towards 18 
 
risk. We use the number of accidents for a particular driver type as our dependent variable, which 
when we restrict attention to accidents linked to personal injuries, can be interpreted as a measure 
of accidental harm. Since each type contains the same kind of drivers and these drivers drive the 
same vehicle models, the numbers of accidents are different across types and over time. These 
differences between the members of a type reflect the frequency of the accidents and they are 
unique to each type. Therefore, these numbers measure the relative personal and property harm 
linked to accidents.
16 We construct annual data on the number of accidents in which a particular 
type has been involved. From the GES data set, we aggregate data, which report individual 
accidents by model, to produce the yearly number of accidents of a particular vehicle model. 
We define the dependent variable  it Type Acc ln _ _  as the natural logarithm of the number of 
accidents in which a particular driver type was involved in a given year. With this definition of the 
dependent variable, we face one potentially serious problem. The number of vehicles in use is not 
constant over time because the vehicles that had severe accidents will be removed from the road, 
but we do not observe the number of vehicles that have been dropped from the road over time. 
Therefore, if we simply use the number of vehicles in use on the road regardless of the vehicle 
year-model, we have to know the number of vehicles that have been discarded during a particular 
year. One solution is to restrict the number of vehicle-year models. It is reasonable to restrict the 
vehicles up to the 5-year-old ones because the number of vehicles in use does not change much 
during the first 5 years. Ross and Wenzel (2001) argue that 97 percent of 5-year-old vehicles are 
still in use on the road. Therefore, it is reasonable to restrict the data up to 5-year-old or newer 
vehicle models. Another reason for this restriction is that one of the main determinants of accidents 
may come from drivers’ negligence in maintenance as the vehicles are getting older. For example, 
if a vehicle is a 20-year-old model, then the probability that the original defects of the vehicle 19 
 
cause an accident is very low. Also, around 90 percent of the recalls are issued within 3 years after 
the introduction of the new-year model. Therefore, our conclusions are unlikely to be affected by 
restricting our attention to newer vehicle data. 
Following the recommendations from two anonymous referees we have decided to drop some 
vehicle models because of their likely use. In particular, we have eliminated the model Crown 
Victoria from our data sample because of its heavy public use, given that as many as 25 percent of 
the accidents that involved this model were identified as police cars, and the accidents they are 
likely to be involved in are clearly not likely to be related to defects in the vehicles. The removal of 
this model has actually helped our estimation results in terms of reducing the standard errors of our 
estimates. Other related concerns raised by the referees include the use of certain cars as rentals. 
Unfortunately, the accident data does not allow us to identify rental cars, and while we agree that 
drivers of rentals cars behave differently than drivers of individually owned vehicles, we are still 
interested in observing what the effects of recalls on these rental cars are, after controlling for the 
characteristics of drivers and the unobserved heterogeneity captured by the composite types we 
construct. Interestingly, we have found information by the Department of Transportation that 
indicates many time rental fleets and even taxi-fleets have been found to have correction rates 
below those of privately owned vehicles.
17 This finding indicates that if we find sizable effects of 
recalls on the number of accidents, these effects could be biased downwards given that we would 
be including rentals, which are less likely to be corrected and are also driven by drivers less likely 
to know about the defects of the vehicle. Therefore, this group of vehicles are more likely to lead to 
results that show small effects of recalls on accidents over time.
18 
Other issues with this definition of the dependent variable are connected with the 
representativeness of the data collected on accidents. Some of the worries include the fact that the 20 
 
accidents will for sure be reported if they led to injuries and are more likely to be reported if the 
cars are newer and rentals. Some of these issues we will be able to control for, others will be harder 
for us to deal with, but we will try to provide convincing sensitivity analysis of our results to make 
the case for the robustness of our main findings regarding the effects of recalls on the number of 
accidents. 
When estimating the effect of correction rates on the number of accidents after a recall, the 
dependent variable is calculated as the natural logarithm of the average number of accidents of a 
particular vehicle year model in the 3 years after the particular recall.
19 In this case the level of 
observation is the recall of a particular vehicle year model. When a recall includes more than one 




The main independent variables of interest are the ones related to recalls. Each recall has a 
different number of units, with some recalls containing a small number of vehicles while others 
include a substantially larger number. To account for this we construct a weighted recall variable, 
which is achieved by calculating the ratio of the number of vehicles affected by a particular recall 
to the number of the vehicles in use on the road. To avoid possible endogeneity problems, the 
denominator will be the sum of the vehicles sold in the 4 years prior to the year of that particular 



























int R  is the number of the units of a recall  n, issued at time  t, for the vehicle model  v. The 
vehicle model includes only year models no older than 5 years (from t to  4  t ). 
v
ijt S  is the 
number of units of the  j  year-vehicle model that are on the road as of time  1  t . All drivers in 
group  i drive the same vehicle model  v. This variable represents how many vehicles are at risk 
among all vehicles on the road as of the year before the recall, and also how many vehicles are to 
be fixed due to recall issuance.
20 In the econometric specification, the coefficient on this variable 
can be directly interpreted as the effect of recalls on the number of accidents in percentage terms, 
given the nature of the dependent variable. The effect should be understood to affect only the units 
recalled. 
Notice that issuance itself is different from correction. However, it sends a signal to the 
drivers whose vehicles are potentially dangerous. The signal may change the drivers’ behavior: 
They may drive less frequently or drive more carefully until their vehicles are fixed. Therefore, 
recall announcements themselves may affect the number of accidents by either changing drivers’ 
behavior or fixing the defects. In the empirical work, we will use data on correction rates to make 
the argument that although we do not know the effect that changes in behavior have on accidents, 
we can show that correction rates do matter, suggesting that while we cannot dismiss the 
behavioral change from drivers as an explanation of any changes in the number of accidents, it is 
not the whole story, otherwise correction rates would have no effects on accidents. 
When we use the whole sample of accidents, the indicator  Strike takes the value of 1 if the 
vehicle struck other vehicles or objects. In the specifications that include all accidents, the variable 
Strike is used to distinguish the role of the drivers’ faults and the vehicle’s defects. In all the 
specifications, and following comments from anonymous referees, we have also used this variable 
to restrict attention only to accidents linked to striking vehicles, given that struck vehicles’ 22 
 
involvement in the accidents is unlikely to be linked to any defects, as long as this variable is a 
good indicator of which vehicle is at fault in the accident. 
Given that age is also an important control, we divide individuals by their age into 4 groups. 
The first age group is for drivers under 26. The second age group is between 26 and 35, the third 
age group consists of those aged 36 to 49, and the fourth for those 50 and older. 
Another important explanatory variable reflects whether the manufacturers have redesigned a 
vehicle model in the period of analysis. This is an important variable because one natural reaction 
by manufacturers to a large number of accidents tied to defects is to fix the problems in a new 
model. However, design changes can also introduce an array of new problems, especially if car 
makers feel the pressure to launch new models to keep up with market rivals. This market pressure 
to put new models up for sale might be going on in the current environment, leading, for example, 
to serious defects in cars built by Toyota shortly after it became the world’s largest producer and 
launched a number of new year models. This scenario is supported by the recent theoretical work 
of Carpenter, Grimmer, and Lomazoff (2009) who find that short experimentation before the 
launching of a product can lead to lower quality products reaching the market when the producers 
of those products are large companies. We build upon the definition used in Berry, Levinshon, and 
Pakes (1995) and consider that a new model was introduced if either horsepower changed by 10 
percent or more, or one of the other indicators (width, length, and wheelbase) had a substantial 
change, considering the usual changes in that type of indicator. A related explanatory variable is a 
measure of the vintage of the cars on the road of a particular model. We calculate this variable as 
the percentage of cars of a particular model that belong to the two latest year models.
21 
An additional logical control is the total number of cars on the road of a particular vehicle 
model. We use the sum of all the cars of a particular model sold in the 4 years preceding the year of 23 
 
observation. This helps control for the level effect correlated with the probability of being in an 
accident. Given that the sales effect could be nonlinear, we also include sales squared as an 
independent variable. The latter turns out to be quite important, given that its omission leads to a 
biasing upwards (in absolute value) of the recall coefficient, given that it is a ratio and therefore 
captures some nonlinearities of relationships we study. 
In all specifications we add year dummies to capture the changes in accidents as the number of 
total vehicles on the road evolves in the 1988 to 2001 period. We also include binary indicators for 
the different vehicle models. These variables are used to group drivers into the different types. 
Therefore, these indicators are constant over time, but changing across the types. Table A3, in the 
Appendix, provides the list of vehicle models included in the analysis. 
When estimating the effect of correction rates on the number of accidents after a recall, the 
key independent variable is the correction rate of the particular recall analyzed. This measures the 
proportion of vehicles that have been fixed, out of the original pool of defective vehicles. These 
rates are reported by the manufacturers. Other independent variables in the analysis include the 
average sales of the particular year model, the size of the recalls and its square, the number of 
recalls after the particular recall of analysis, whether the recall was considered hazardous, and the 
manufacturer of the vehicle recalled. 
 
Summary Statistics 
There are roughly 250 vehicle models in the U.S. automobile market and the number of models 
varies slightly over time. In our analysis we choose the vehicle models according to the following 
selection criteria: First, while 97 percent of light vehicles are still on the road, only 93 percent of 
trucks are on the road within 5 years. Therefore, we concentrate on light vehicles and one SUV. 24 
 
Another justification for this is that trucks are mostly commercial. However, we decided to 
consider the inclusion of SUVs in the sample because recently we have seen more frequent and 
notorious recalls for SUVs, even though SUVs are in the truck category, most SUVs are not used 
for commercial purposes. However, many SUVs were problematic since recall data was reported 
by model lines that have separate accident data, like the Ford Explorer and the Ford Bronco, or the 
Plymouth and Chrysler Voyager, preventing us from tracking the variables of interest as with other 
models. Second, we add more new vehicles that have recently appeared in the market if their 
market shares are substantially increasing over time. Third, we exclude models with a market 
share under 1 percent of the market of current year models to avoid small sample problems in our 
empirical strategy, which in some cases affected vehicles that loss considerable market share by 
the mid 1990s like the Camaro. Fourth, during the time period of interest, some firms have merged 
and other firms stopped production of a particular model. We have excluded those models at this 
time. As mentioned earlier we have eliminated one popular car, the Crown Victoria, because it is 
widely used as a police car. Overall, we include 19 vehicle models whose unit sales are consistent 
over time. These vehicle models have been popular and have large market shares over time. 
In Table 4 we provide summary statistics for the full sample (74,806 observations) of 
individual-level accidents of our 14 years of repeated cross-sections. Fifty percent of individuals 
involved in accidents are males, around 43 percent are aged over 35, and the most popular vehicle 
models in our sample are Escort, Accord, Cavalier, Taurus, and Civic. This is very much in line 
with the market shares in the U.S. car market in the period between the late 1980s and the turn of 
the century. 
Table 5 shows summary statistics once we have grouped individuals by composite types. 
There are almost 4,000 observations in this data set, which comes from following the 304 types 25 
 
(which include 19 different vehicle models, four age categories, two genders, and whether the 
vehicle was the striking one) for 14 years. The average composite type got into just over 18 
accidents on average during a year. The maximum number of accidents among all groups is 141. 
Regarding the recall variables, we see that 14 percent of the vehicles on the road have been 
recalled. The maximum value is larger than 1 because one recall may include more than one 
defective part so more than one recall can affect a particular model in a given year, which appears 
here as recalling a larger number of vehicles. Of the vehicles for which recalls were issued, 55 
percent received hazard ratings (A or B). In our empirical work, and in order to compare our 
empirical strategy to the seminal work on synthetic panels, we also divide our sample only by the 
19 vehicle models we analyze in the paper. It will be clear later that the qualitative results do not 
change much, but do illuminate the trade-offs between minimizing the possible measurement error 
problem involved in analysis of repeated cross-sections and computing efficient parameter 
estimates of the variables of interest, the efficiency of which is a function of the homogeneity of 
the composite-types. 
Table 6 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the correction rate estimation. 
The average number of accidents for the recalls analyzed is over 200, and the correction rate for 
the recalls in the sample is 69.13 percent, the average units sold in the 3 years after the recall are 
687,000, the average size of the recalls included in the sample is 241,000, and the number of 
recalls after the current recall, of the same year model in the 3 years after the original recall, is 
2.13. 
 
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
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In order to analyze the effects of recalls on safety, it would be ideal to have panel data to control for 
the individual specific heterogeneity that results in potentially different outcomes when faced with 
a given situation on the road. It is also necessary to control for vehicle characteristics, 
manufacturers decisions regarding new model introduction, and characteristics of the drivers. The 
problem is that there are no panel data on accidents of individual drivers, so it is essentially 
impossible to observe an individual driver’s behavior and his or her response to recalls over time. 
Only repeated cross-sectional data on accidents is available, which does not allow us to control for 
individual specific driving abilities. Without those controls our models can say relatively little 
about the effects of recalls on safety over time. 
To circumvent this problem we propose to produce synthetic panel data using the repeated 
cross-sections independently collected each year, following the work of Deaton (1985) and 
Verbeek and Nijman (1992).
22 For this, we use the concept of a “type” or “group.” This notion 
starts with the fact that, corresponding to individual drivers’ behavior, there will be a group version 
of such behavior, if we group drivers by some characteristics, and the type of car they drive. If we 
group drivers whose characteristics are similar into a type, we can then track the drivers’ behavior 
over time through these types. Within a group, we have drivers whose driving characteristics are 
similar, and we can consider this type as if it were an individual. Browning, Deaton, and Irish 
(1985) provide an empirical application using British data from the 1970s, where they divide 
groups by aggregating age cohorts and by whether the head of the household was a manual worker. 
Attanasio and Weber (1993) and Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994) use a very similar 
specification, also using British expenditure data, and divide the groups by age. 
One of the major differences among these drivers is that they drive different vehicle models. 
Since we investigate the effect of recalls of particular vehicle models on accidents, the type must 27 
 
also contain information on vehicle characteristics. If we again divide these drivers by vehicle 
models, then we can control for drivers’ and vehicles’ fixed effects. We also believe that dividing 
by vehicle models controls for additional unobserved characteristics of drivers correlated with the 
type of car they drive, such as income, wealth, or even attitude towards risk. Since a type contains 
a particular vehicle model and a driver’s type at the same time, we call this a “composite type.”
23 
This netting-out effect enables us to statistically distinguish characteristics that are related to 
the defects from all others. Therefore, our level of observation is a group of individual drivers who 
have the same personal characteristics and drive the same vehicle model at the time of the accident. 
Now each composite type appears repeatedly over time. If we have enough composite types, 
successive cross-sections of accident data will generate successive random samples from the 
composite type population. 
Notice, as we have mentioned in the previous sections, that one disadvantage of using the 
synthetic panel strategy is that we cannot use the sample weights provided in the GES data set to 
make the data we use truly representative of the U.S. population, given that our level of 
observation is the composite type, and the relevant information is the number of accidents that 
composite types is involved in each year, preventing us from assigning the weights linked to each 
accident. 
 
The Measurement Error Problem 
Given that each composite type has its own characteristics, like an individual driver, we need to 
use summary measures that represent these characteristics, not individual measures because they 
should show common characteristics of individuals within a type. Composite type means are the 
statistic we choose in this setting. However, if we use sample means of the type, then we face a 28 
 
measurement error problem. The unobserved effects are no longer constant over time since 
composite type population means are different from composite type sample means. These errors 
are added to the unobserved type effects so that the effects change over time. Deaton (1985) 
showed that it is possible to use the synthetic panel data model solely from cross-sectional data if 
large numbers of observations are available in each period, or if the estimators are corrected for the 
error in variables problem. 
Verbeek and Nijman (1992) reached the same conclusion, and they investigate the conditions 
that make this approach valid. Their conclusion is that the larger the number of observations per 
type, the less severe the measurement error problem will be. The latter set of authors and Collado 
(1997) pointed out that there is a trade-off between the number of observations per type and the 
number of types, given a sample size. Collado argues that the cross-sectional sizes of the most 
widely used data sets are relatively small, and therefore the problem comes from the fact that we 
are trying to make as many types as we can, but with a relatively small number of total 
observations, the measurement error becomes serious. In general in order to make the 
measurement error less serious the number of observations per cohort should be large enough, but 
not so large that the variance of the parameters of interest is too large. 
Measurement error, however, is unlikely to be an issue in our preferred specifications with 
finer types, because we are not averaging any characteristics within the groups. The dependent 
variable is not an average but a cell count (the number of accidents in the cell) and the independent 
variables are in all cases either the variables we use to divide the types, or in the case of the recall 
rate, the variable is the same number for all the vehicles of a particular model in a given year. 
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Consider the following equation to represent the relationship between accidental harm of a 
particular individual and the possible causes involved in the accident,  






dt dt d dt c x f y     (2) 
where  dt y  measures accidental harm that a driver  d  incurred at time  t.  D d 1,..., = .  D is the 
total number of drivers who had the accidents at time t.  dt x  are the driver d ‘s characteristics 
that affect the accidents in which he or she is involved. They include the observed factors that are 
used to group drivers. 
v
dt   are the vehicle characteristics that are not related to the defects, where 
v is an indicator of the vehicle he or she drives. 
v
dt   are the vehicle characteristics that are related 
to the defects.  d c  is the driver’s unobserved factors. 
v
d   is the vehicle’s unobserved factors. 
A convenient functional form to express the relationship is  
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where  dt   is the unobserved random disturbance. The aggregating process changes the latter 
equation to  
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1 =  .  n is the number of observations 
in the composite type c. The variables become the types’ mean values and represent group 
characteristics that affect the dependent variable. Since the variables in   are the dummy 
variables indicating vehicle models, the unobserved vehicle fixed effect is absorbed into these 
variables. Rewriting the last equation  30 
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 (5) 
where  v d  is the vector of vehicle dummies. 
This grouping controls for driver and vehicle characteristics that are not related to the defects. 
The difference in accidental harm over time and across types may come from other observable 
factors including the changes in recall variables and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity 
between the types. By making the composite type, some unobserved components are controlled by 
the panel data strategy. However, the error term,  ct  ~ , now contains a type-specific trend in the 
process of aggregation. If there exists a cohort-specific trend, then an additional source of 
heterogeneity arises. Therefore we need a separate term to account for this. We can then write  
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 (6) 
and we will define  it  ~  =  ct g T   . In the panel setting,  001 1988,...,2 = t  and  4 1,.....,30 = c , 
where  t is a year and  c is a composite type. To express the equation in a simple matrix notation, 
we redefine the equation as  
  N i T t c X y it i it it 1,..., = 1,..., = =      (7) 
 
where  ct it y y ~ = ,  )
~
( =
1 = ct v
V
v ct it d x X    ,  ] [ = 3 2 1        , and  c i c c ~ = . Now i  represents a 
composite type.  it X  contains observable variables that change across  t but not i, variables that 
change across  i but not t, and variables that change across  i and t. We call  i c  the unobserved 
composite type effect. 
We can modify this model to account for a type-specific trend:  
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  N i T t c a z X y it i i it it it 1,..., = 1,..., = =       (8) 
 
where  ) (1, = T z it  ,  it z  is  2 1 ,  i a  is  1 2 ,  it y  is  K  1 ,  it X  is  K  1 , and    is  1  K . The 
latter is the equation we use for estimation of the traditional synthetic panel data model. For the 
model, the strict exogeneity assumption of the idiosyncratic error term with respect to the 
regressors is imposed. After constructing this basic panel data structure, the same inference 
procedure as in traditional panel data models can be used.
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Finally, once we construct our composite types in a finer fashion, the measurement error 
issues disappear, and we are left with a traditional panel data estimation of equation (8), where the 
level of observation is the composite type, and where the maintained assumption is that the 
unobserved heterogeneity components, which we are accounting for, are group specific and it is 
meaningful to track the number of accidents of these types over time. 
 
Correction Rates Model 
When estimating the effect of correction rates on the number of accidents after a recall, we 
estimate the following equation  
  N i T t v X y it i i 1,..., = 1,..., = =    (9) 
where  0 = ) | ( x v E it . Here  i y  is the natural logarithm of the average number of accidents of the 
year model recalled, in the 3 years after the recall, and the explanatory variables  i X  are the ones 
explained in the data section, including our main variable of interest in this estimation, that is, the 
correction rate of the recall for that particular year model, as reported by the manufacturer 18 
months after the initial recall. If more than one recall was issued in a given year, we take the one 
with the highest hazard rate or the one that recalls the largest number of units, if the hazard levels 32 
 
are the same. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Do recalls reduce the number of accidents? 
Tables 7A to 7D report the random effects estimates of the different specifications of the panel 
data models applied to repeated cross-sections of accidents and using vehicle models recall data.
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In all of these tables we focus only on the 19 vehicle models we analyze, and we report the effect 
on the number of accidents of all recalls and also hazardous recalls, restricting in some cases 
attention to accidents of striking vehicles, and also selecting the sample by whether the accidents 
lead to injuries or not. Notice here that we are only controlling for the vehicle model effect, not for 
any unobserved heterogeneity linked to drivers. 
The first two columns of all the tables group accidents only by the type of vehicle model 
involved in the accident, and do not include covariates that need averaging within groups. This 
specification essentially uses a panel of the vehicle models we have chosen to analyze and studies 
the connection between the accidents affecting those vehicles and the recalls issued on those them. 
Columns 3 and 4 of the tables use standard synthetic panel specifications (Deaton, 1985), and 
while grouping accidents only by vehicle model, they do include covariates that are the result of 
averaging characteristics of the drivers within each group. These latter parameter estimates are 
potentially subject to measurement error. However, the large number of observations in each of the 
groups, ameliorates this problem considerably. As shown in Table 8, the number of observations in 
most of the groups is in the several hundreds. Here each group represents a vehicle model. 
Table 7A shows the results of considering all accidents from the vehicle models analyzed, 
which means we are not separating accidents that lead to injury from those that do not, and not 33 
 
separating accidents of striking or struck vehicles. The result suggests that recalls reduce accidents 
by between 10 percent and 16 percent, depending on whether we look at hazard recalls and include 
average characteristics by groups of drivers, but the effects are not statistically significant. The fit 
of the model is, however, quite good, especially when accounting for the average characteristics of 
the drivers of those models. 
Table 7B restricts attention to accidents linked to striking vehicles, given that it could be 
argued that including in the analysis vehicles that were struck could be rather noisy and not very 
meaningful, given that the police seemed to have identified them as playing a fairly passive role in 
the accident. The latter, however, is unclear. A vehicle could be the struck one and be the one that 
provoked the accident. The classification by the police can potentially be a noisy measure of the 
actual events of the accident, much noisier than other measures which are easier to observe (by 
looking at the cars, the drivers, or from the drivers’ licences) and do not depend on the accounts of 
the accident by the drivers (and passengers) of the vehicles involved. In any case we also present 
all of our results for this subsample of accidents. The point estimate of the recall coefficients are 
similar (the rest of the coefficients are almost all significant and vary relatively little from the 
previous specification), but now the results are significant once we control for the average 
characteristics of drivers and the effects of recalls on accidents varies between just below 16 
percent to just below 20 percent, with the fit of the model still at very high levels. The effect is still 
predicted to be quite large, but we have to remember that as in Table 7A, we are still not 
accounting for the unobserved characteristics of drivers. 
Table 7C further restricts the sample by only including accidents linked to personal injuries 
(and also only striking vehicles). The idea here (following an anonymous referee’s comment) is 
that this could allow us to circumvent selection concerns regarding the sample of accidents 34 
 
gathered by the police, given that accidents in which injuries occurred will almost always be 
reported to the police, while accidents in which only property damage is involved are more likely 
to be kept off the books. One disadvantage of this restriction is that if a recall campaign had the 
effect of reducing the severity of accidents (as show in Bae & Benítez-Silva, in press), then this 
restriction could potentially bias upwards (making the coefficient more negative) the effect of 
recalls on accidents, given that even if the number of accidents for that group of drivers stays the 
same, as long as the severity declines enough, the estimate would show an effect of recalls. As 
conjectured, the coefficients are now much larger (more negative) and statistically significant, 
indicating a large effect of recalls on the number of accidents. Given our discussion, these results 
should be taken with caution and understood as indicating that recalls likely reduce severity of 
accidents as well. 
Table 7D presents the results of restricting attention to accidents linked to striking vehicles 
that did not lead to personal injuries, but only property damage. Here the results are somewhat 
weaker, with a smaller effect of recalls on accidents but still significant once we control for 
average characteristics. As we will see later, this result becomes even weaker when we control for 
additional sources of unobserved heterogeneity, suggesting that less serious accidents are unlikely 
to be the result of car defects. 
All these results are suggestive, but this coarse grouping by vehicle model, however, results in 
the inefficiencies discussed in the literature, due to the prevalent heterogeneity within each group. 
So we would ideally further control for other sources of heterogeneity, which could be biasing our 
estimates, and we do so by defining in a finer fashion the composite groups in our specifications. 
In Tables 9 and 10 we show our main results, where we improve upon the specifications just 
discussed, in that the groups are now defined much more finely. A type is now defined not only by 35 
 
vehicle model, but also by gender, age group, and by whether the vehicle was the striking one in 
the accident in the specifications that include both striking and struck vehicles. Overall we have 
more than 300 groups. This fine grouping allows us to estimate the parameters of interest in a 
considerably more efficient way and avoid completely the measurement error problem that could 
be biasing our coefficients of interest, since the problematic covariates of interest are in this case 
indicators of whether the accident belongs to a particular age group, gender group, or striking 
group, and are not averaged within groups. 
Table 9 reports the estimates by random effects of the panel data model in equation (8) for the 
whole sample of types, and all recalls, and shows four specifications, depending of whether we 
include accidents by all vehicles involved or only striking ones, and whether we include all 
accidents or only those that lead to injuries, or no injuries. Again, the main finding is that recalls 
are effective in reducing the number of accidents in all specifications. The coefficients in the 
different specifications of our main explanatory variable of interest,  Rate Rec_ , is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better, and depending on the particular sub-sample 
it varies from 7.8 percent when concentrating on striking vehicles in all types of accidents, to over 
16 percent when we further restrict our attention to only injury related accidents. These results 
should be understood to mean that, for example, an increase of 10 percent in the recall rate of a 
particular model, will decrease the number of accidents by between 0.78 percent and 1.6 percent. 
Interestingly, in the last column of the table, in the specification that restricts attention to accidents 
that did not lead to any injury, the effect is much smaller and not statistically significant, indicating 
that non-serious accidents do not seem to vary with recall rates. Of course, these results are the 
product of a given timing of the recall with respect to the accidents or events that lead to them, and 
the average type of recall (more or less hazardous) that is observed in the data used for estimation. 36 
 
The variable that indicates whether a model’s design change was introduced in a given period, 
Design Change, has a positive and significant effect, indicating that although design changes are 
likely to fix problems with previous versions of the car, new features and engineering changes lead 
to a higher number of accidents, other things equal, and after controlling for time trends and 
vehicle indicators. Notice that this effect is fairly stable across the specifications shown, 
suggesting that a design change does not seem to affect the likelihood of entering the sample of 
accidents given that even when concentrating on injury-related accidents the effect of design 
changes on the number of accidents does not differ much. The positive coefficient suggests that the 
many pressures that car makers have to launch new products every year could be resulting in larger 
and larger number of problems with the vehicles. This effect seems to be offsetting the possible 
improvement in engineering that comes with the introduction of a new design.
26 
The stability of the Design Change indicator contrasts with the sizable changes in the Vintage 
coefficient across specifications. The very large and positive effect when analyzing all vehicles 
and all injury levels is reduced considerably when concentrating only on striking vehicles, and is 
further reduced dramatically when concentrating on striking vehicles linked to accidents that lead 
to injuries. Such reduction in the coefficient suggests that newer vehicles are likely to appear in 
larger numbers in the accident data collected by the government (police reports) and drivers seem 
to be more likely to report relatively minor accidents in order to be able to get covered by their 
insurance companies. This can be considered a problem linked to selection (which we cannot 
directly control for, by construction of the data, which is a cross-section of accidents only), which 
can reveal itself as a type of misspecification. This suggests we should be careful interpreting this 
parameter estimate, especially when selectivity concerns are present given that it likely captures 
the effect of Vintage on the number of accidents as well as the fact that newer vehicles are more 37 
 
likely to enter the sample accidents we use. Later in the section we will provide the results of 
omitting this variable (and the Design Change variable) from the estimation. However, that 
strategy can lead to possibly serious omitted variable biases, given that newer vehicles are also 
more likely to be recalled (the correlation coefficient is around 0.24 in the larger sample), so the 
omission of the Vintage indicator will bias the recall coefficient towards zero. 
Not surprisingly, the number of vehicles on the road of a particular model has a strong and 
significant positive effect on the number of accidents, with the model predicting that an increase in 
100,000 cars on the road increases the number of accidents by around 50 percent through the linear 
term; however, the quadratic negative term (also significant) reduces this effect considerably. The 
effects are similar across the specifications we show in the table. We also include in the estimation 
binary indicators of the different vehicle models driven by our composite types. Since the Dodge 
Caravan was omitted from the specification, the coefficient for any particular model is the relative 
difference in accident rates for that model and the Caravan. We have also experimented with 
omitting other vehicle models, such as the Ford Mustang, and others that could be used more 
intensively in rental fleets (like Escorts, Cavaliers, or Intrepids), but the results (available from the 
authors upon request) were essentially unchanged. Regarding these indicators, notice that even 
after controlling for the size of the market, more popular vehicle models like Escort, Accord, 
Mustang, or Civic are predicted to be positively related to the number of accidents on the road. 
The rest of the coefficients show a fairly consistent pattern, except for the effect of gender 
(male indicator in this case), which turns negative in the specifications that only analyze 
injury-related accidents, suggesting that once we control for unobserved characteristics women are 
more likely to be involved in these type of accidents. Notice that in the first specification the Strike 
indicator is positive and significant, likely capturing the fact that in a number of accidents only one 38 
 
car (the striking car) was involved. The age dummies have the expected signs and are all positive 
and significant given that the omitted category is drivers 50 and over. Notice that the overall fit of 
the model is quite good, explaining almost 60 percent of the variation in the number of accidents, 
and doing an especially good job in explaining the variation between the different types of drivers. 
We have performed the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for the presence of an 
unobserved effect, and we can soundly reject the OLS model in favor of the random effects 
structure. Also the Hausman test cannot reject the random effects assumption versus the fixed 
effects characterization of the model. This is not surprising since the very nature of our data, a 
cross-section of accidents randomly drawn from the population of accidents on the road each year, 
fits perfectly with the assumptions of the random effects model. Also, it is difficult to argue that 
the unobserved heterogeneity component that affects our composite-type driver has much to do 
with the covariates related to the vehicle model they are driving. Therefore, in all the tables we 
report the results of a modified random effects model that contains a time-trend. In fact, this 
modified characterization (which includes time dummies and vehicle dummies) makes the random 
effects and the fixed effects essentially identical, explaining the results of the Hausman test 
mentioned above. In fact, for the recall variable the results are identical, given that the recall 
variable drops from a “between” estimation since all types that share a vehicle model face the same 
recall rates over time.
27 
Table 10 concentrates only on hazardous recalls, given that it could be argued that recalls of 
fairly minor defects (such as a defect in the windshield) are unlikely to have any effect on the 
accidents on the road. The results do not change much from the ones reported above, except that 
the recall effects are now larger across the board. For the full sample they go up to 14.85 percent, 
and they go up to around 19.5 percent if we restrict attention to accidents of striking vehicles that 39 
 
resulted in injuries. 
Table 11 first replicates the second column of results from Table 10, which includes accidents 
of striking vehicles only that resulted in all types of injuries, and then separates the results by 
whether the cars involved are produced by a domestic or foreign manufacturer. There are no major 
differences between these two categories of cars, suggesting that once we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity the recall effect is not a function of the producers of the vehicles. There are some 
differences, however, in some of the other coefficients like a non-significant coefficient of the 
gender dummy in the case of foreign vehicles, and the much stronger age effects for their 
manufacturers, while the Vintage effect (the proportion of vehicles produced in the last 2 years as a 
fraction of the total produced in the last 5 years) is only significant for domestic vehicles as a 
predictor of the number of accidents.
28 This difference in the Vintage coefficient is likely linked to 
the market shares for different manufacturers, which leads to higher (lower) proportion of newer 
vehicles on the road after years of high (low) sales, leading to more accidents (an effect that the 
sales measure cannot capture). This effect is more clearly identified for domestic manufacturers 
given the higher variability in their market shares in the period of analysis, with sharp declines in 
the market shares of GM and Ford, but steady and relatively modest increases by the Japanese 
manufacturers (see Train & Winston, 2007, and 
/ 28 / / / . // : summary UsaSa historical keydata com wardsauto http at Ward’s Automotive’s website). 
In Table A.4 we also show results using hazard recalls but drop the Vintage and Design 
Change variables to take into account possible concerns regarding their role in the selection 
process that leads to the sample of accidents in the GES system, given that newer vehicles and 
newer models are more likely to appear as reporting accidents than older vehicles. However, as 
discussed earlier, omitting these variables from the specification opens the door to possible 40 
 
omitted variable biases, given the fairly strong correlation of these variables with the recall rates, 
since most of the recalls happen in the first years after the launching of a new model. We can see 
that the recall coefficient is now a bit smaller in some of the specifications, going as low as to 8.3 
percent, but not by much once we restrict attention to injury-related accidents, which provide the 
estimate more likely to be free of possible biases due to the possible selection into the sample of 
accidents. All of this can be interpreted as suggesting that newer vehicles are more likely to be 
recalled, but also have more accidents, so when we remove them from the estimation a classic 
omitted variable bias arises reducing the coefficient on the recall variable. The rest of the 
coefficients do not change much, and the overall pattern of the results regarding the effects of 




Are Higher Correction Rates of Recalls Linked to Fewer Accidents? 
The main results presented in the previous subsection leave one question open. Are recalls 
effective because people fix their cars or because they change their behavior after they know about 
the problem, even if they do not take the car to be fixed? The debate on how behavior adjustments 
by individuals can affect safety outcomes goes back to Peltzman (1975), and a large number of 
articles with mixed empirical results, including Crandall and Graham (1984), and more recently, 
using Canadian data, Sen (2001).
30 It is unlikely that the reduction in accident rates caused by 
recalls is all due to behavioral adjustment, given that information is sent to drivers from 
manufacturers only about the need to fix their cars, not about how dangerous the defect could be. It 
is clear, however, from the numbers on correction rates that not everyone takes their cars to the 
shop to be fixed. Manufacturers report an average correction rate of about 68.85 percent for the 41 
 
recalls of the vehicle models analyzed in this paper. The number would not be very different if we 
were to take all recalls issued in the last few years.
31 
The estimation of equation (9) presented in Table 12, provides evidence of the importance of 
correction rates in the number of accidents after a recall. We use the sample of recalls linked to the 
19 vehicle models used in the previous section (therefore we exclude recalls of year models older 
than 5 years), and after restricting attention only to one recall if multiple recalls are issued on a 
given year, and after having to aggregate across many models or year models due to the fact that 
many vehicles share components that are recalled, we have a sample of a just fewer than 100 
observations. Even with this relatively small number of observations our results are very clear. The 
higher the correction rates of a recall, the lower the number of accidents of that year model in the 3 
years following the recall. Other variables that are significant are the average total sales of that 
vehicle model in the 3 years of analysis (and its square term) and the size of the recall, both 
correlated with a higher number of accidents. Regarding the indicators of the different 
manufacturers, Chrysler cars subject to recalls are predicted to have the least number of accidents. 
The fit of this simple model is very good, with an 
2 R  close to 90 percent. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have investigated the effects of vehicle recalls on safety, measured by the number 
of accidents. A synthetic panel data model approach was adopted and estimated, linking 
government data on accidents with industry data on recalls, sales, introduction of new models, and 
other market indicators. Our results show that recalls reduce the number of accidents. Recalls of a 
particular model reduce accidents of that model by around 10 percent (the results vary from around 
8 percent to as much as 19 percent depending on the specification), which means that an increase 42 
 
on the recall rate of a particular model by 10 percent will reduce the accidents of that model by 1 
percent. We find that hazard recalls are more effective and if we restrict attention to injury-related 
accidents, the effects gets stronger but could be considered a likely upper bound on the effects. We 
also find that higher correction rates of recall defects are predicted to decrease the number of 
accidents. 
This is the first study to quantify the effects of recalls on the number of accidents, supporting 
the intuition that recalls, if meaningful, should have some effect on safety, but not in line with the 
conjectures of some industry insiders who believe that recalls are an example of government 
over-regulation. We hope this research encourages further research regarding the benefit-cost 
analysis of recalls and the role of policy in making sure drivers fix their cars; What is even more 
important is our hope that it fosters the discussions of regulations that can make manufacturers 
more aware of the social costs of putting a large number of potentially faulty cars on the roads, 
balanced against the private costs associated with making vehicles safer. 
We also believe that our results provide support for a more important role by insurance 
companies and the government in fostering drivers’ education regarding recalls.
32 The lack of 
quantitative evidence linking recalls with increases in safety has limited the amount of support for 
any measure that would make possible an industry-wide role in using recall information. We find 
that recalls reduce accidents and correction rates do matter. Therefore, insurance companies 
should consider taking into account the correction history of particular drivers and cars when 
pricing their insurance, and maybe even make coverage conditional on fixing major recalls. If 
discounts are given to drivers that have fixed their cars, we are likely to see a decline in accidents 
and insurance costs, with the resulting welfare improving effects for society, derived from the 
reduction in the monetary costs and the costs of loss of life due to accidental harm. Also, whether 43 
 
drivers have fixed their cars can be a good indicator of overall maintenance effort in their vehicles, 
likely to be correlated with the likelihood of being in an accident. 
Finally, by showing empirically and quantitatively that recalls are effective, we also hope to 
make policymakers, and the public at large, aware of the fact that maybe some of those recalls, and 
therefore many accidents, could have been prevented. Therefore, the balance between pre-market 
vs. post-market regulation should be revisited for the case of automobiles production and 
commercialization in the United States, given that our finding could be understood as suggesting 
that the presence of post-market costs associated with preventable accidents are indirect evidence 
of the declining cost to society associated with additional pre-market testing. We believe that 
manufacturers currently feel little pressure to minimize the problems of cars before they are put on 
the road, since the direct and indirect costs of the increasing number of recalls seem to be small 
(given that many people never take their recalled cars to be fixed, and many believe and defend 
that recalls have little or no effect on safety) compared with the likely investments (and loss of 
revenue due to delays in introducing new models in an ever more competitive, and increasingly 
complex, industry) needed to reduce defects to a level that would assure a smaller number of 
recalls and prevent accidents. 
We strongly believe that our results, and the results of future research on this topic, are likely 
to have an influence in the car and insurance industry. As we discussed in the introduction, the 
trend seems to be towards asking for a wider release of information regarding recalls, which will 
result in higher correction rates, and in fewer accidents, especially if the insurance industry is able 
to use information on recalls on their pricing strategies. Additionally, our findings suggest that the 
best possible outcome is to prevent as many faulty automobiles from reaching the streets as 
possible, which requires a change in the approach to quality control of the auto industry and the 44 
 
trade-off between pre- and post-market testing. Interestingly, recent research suggest that 
increasing the information to consumers about the quality and safety of products within a regulated 
framework could lead to a higher demand for vehicles, providing some justification for car 
companies to be interested in revamping the pre-market regulations affecting the industry. 
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Figure 2. Average Units Per Recall 











Figure 4. Proportion of Vehicles Recalled 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Recalls: 1988 to 2001 
 
Variable   Category  Frequency  Percent  Variable Category Frequency  Percent 
Initiation   MFR   3,886   74.30   Hazard 
  
  
A   2,870    54.96 
ODI   1,032   19.73  B   241    4.62 
OVSC   312   5.79  C   2,097    40.16 
     D   14    0.27 
   Total   5,230  100.00      Total    5,222   100.00 
Domestic   No   1,208   23.09  Type of 
 recall  
 Vehicle   4,485    85.71 
Yes   4,023   76.91   Other†   748    14.29 
   Total   5,231  100.00      Total    5,233   100.00 
 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)
Issuance  High 






 1988    237    27.43    20.25   81.86   83.12   9.7    15.7 
 1989    283    13.12    20.14   74.56   83.04   27.4    14.9 
 1990    270    8.15    20.37   67.78   77.41   68.1    14.1 
 1991    288    0.00    19.44   62.15   78.82   56.7    12.6 
 1992    221    14.93    22.17   67.87   85.52   59.6    13.1 
 1993    284    69.26    15.49   64.44   84.86   69.3    14.2 
 1994    302    61.92    23.84   75.50   86.09   52.2    15.3 
 1995    345    51.59    29.45   70.72   82.61   141.7    15.1 
 1996    331    58.66    25.98   72.26   86.10   75.4    15.4 
 1997    425    60.57    22.82   66.35   87.53   166.4    15.5 
 1998    475    66.88    28.21   78.11   89.47   76.6    15.5 
 1999    531    70.24    24.86   76.08   90.40   130.0    16.9 
 2000    663    84.29    25.49   81.00   87.48   112.0    17.6 
 2001    578    79.03    18.69   83.56   86.51   96.3    16.6 
  
Source: NHTSA 
 Columns (2) to (5) are in percentages. 
Units per recall is the average number of vehicles per recall issued.  
† The recalls for tires and other equipment are excluded. 




Table 3. Characteristics of Recalls: 1988 to 2001 
 
 
 Variable    Obs.   Mean    Std. dev.   Min   Max 
 Potential number of units affected  †   5,217 94,237 625,516 1 32
 Potential number of units defective  †   5,005 93,456 30,458 1 32
 Domestic manufacturer   5,231 0.77 .42 0 1
 No. of units involved  †   4,802 93,994 652,414 1 32
 No. of units inspected with defect  †   4,972 2,138 17,289 1 0.4
 No. of units corrected  †   4,917 41,814 192,508 0 6
 Ratio of units corrected to units issued   4,802 0.55 .31 0 7.5
 No. of unreachable units  †   4,911 8,477 400,198 0 28
 Hazard category code   5,222 3.14 .97 1 4
  
  
Source: NHTSA.  
† Units of maximum values are in millions.  
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for Individual-Level Observations ( 74,806 = n ) 
 
 











Strike .5868  .4924  0 1 
Age 16 to 25  .3224  .4674  0  1 
Age 26 to 35  .2439  .4295  0  1 
Age 36 to 49  .2393  .4266  0  1 
Age 50+  .1944  .3957  0  1 
 
 
Mustang .0552  .2283  0  1 
Escort .0992  .2990  0 1 
Accord .1043  .3057 0  1 
Century .0215  .1451 0  1 
Cavalier .0905  .2868  0  1 
Marquis .0177  .1319  0  1 
Cougar .0163  .1268 0  1 
Civic .0819  .2742  0  1 
Corolla .0591  .2359 0  1 
Cherokee .0584 .2345  0  1 
Sentra .0553  .2287  0 1 
Taurus .0839  .2773  0  1 
Sable .0211  .1437  0  1 
GrandAM .0596  .2367  0  1 
Camry .0732  .2604  0  1 
Altima .0273  .1630  0  1 
Intrepid .0147  .1202 0  1 
LeSabre .0243  .1539  0  1 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics for All Accidents of Composite Types: 1988 to 2001. 
( 3,952 = c ) 
  
 Variable    Mean   Std. dev.   Min    Max 
 Dependent variable:  
Ln_Acc_Type 2.5348 1.0136 -.6931 4.9488
Acc_Type 18.7869 15.5972 .5 141
Ln_Acc_Type_NI 2.1823 1.0391 -.6931 4.6347
Acc_Type_NI 13.4728 11.3405 .5 103
Ln_Acc_Type_I 1.1856 1.0638 -.6931 3.9512
Acc_Type_I 5.3363 5.3229 .5 52
  
Independent variables:  
Male .5 .5000 0 1
Strike .5 .5000 0 1
Age 16 to 25  .25 .4331 0 1
Age 26 to 35  .25 .4331 0 1
Age 36 to 49  .25 .4331 0 1
Age 50+  .25 .4331 0 1
Rec_Rate .1400 .2568 0 1.616
Rec_Rate_H .0740 .1894 0 1.616
Sales 8.1146 3.7835 1.2669 16.6016
Sales square  80.1586 69.9183 1.6051 275.6132
Design change  .4049 .4909 0 1
Vintage .4111 .0805 .1925 .9866
Mustang .0567 .2313 0 1
Escort .0567 .2313 0 1
Accord .0567 .2313 0 1
Century .0567 .2313 0 1
Cavalier .0567 .2313 0 1
Marquis .0567 .2313 0 1
Cougar .0567 .2313 0 1
Civic .0567 .2313 0 1
Corolla .0567 .2313 0 1
Cherokee .0536 .2253 0 1
Sentra .0567 .2313 0 1
Taurus .0567 .2313 0 1
Sable .0567 .2313 0 1
GrandAM .0567 .2313 0 1
Camry .0567 .2313 0 1
Intrepid .0324 .1771 0 1
Altima .0202 .1408 0 1
LeSabre .0567 .2313 0 1
Caravan .0405 .1971 0 1
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Table 6. Summary Statistics for Correction Rate Estimation 
  
Variable    Obs.   Mean   Std. dev.   Min    Max 
 
Dependent variable:  
Ln_Ave_Acct 87 5.07 .7433 3.34  6.80
Ave_Accidents 87 210.35 171.46 28.25  901.75
  
Independent variables:  
Corrate 87 69.13 20.7120 8.37  100
Ave_Sales 87 687.11 559.1277 98.09  2850.51
Ave_Sales_Square 87 781156.2 1445979 9426.273  8125385
Size_Recall 87 2.41 3.68 .0024  22.16
Size_Square 87 1.92 6.1088 0  49.12
Recalls_After 87 2.13 2.59 0  17
Hazard 87 .54 .5013 0  1
Ford 87 .2529 .4372 0  1
GM 87 .2759 .4495 0  1
Chrysler 87 .2414 .4304 0  1
Toyota 87 .1034 .3063 0  1
Honda 87 .0920 .2906 0  1
Nissan 87 .0345 .1835 0  1
Year_1988 87 .0690 .2549 0  1
Year_1989 87 .0230 .1507 0  1
Year_1990 87 .0230 .1507 0  1
Year_1991 87 .0805 .2736 0  1
Year_1992 87 .0920 .2906 0  1
Year_1993 87 .0805 .2736 0  1
Year_1994 87 .0690 .2549 0  1
Year_1995 87 .0920 .2906 0  1
Year_1996 87 .1609 .3696 0  1
Year_1997 87 .1724 .3799 0  1
Year_1998 87 .1379 .3468 0  1
  
Notes: If many recalls have been issued in a particular year, only the most hazardous or the largest recall is 
included, if two or more have the same hazard level. The recalls between 1999 and 2001 are not included in 
this sample because the accident data sets after 2001 are not available. Some recalls with very low correction 
rates (fewer than 1 percent) are dropped. 
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Table 7.A. Synthetic Panel Data Model—Grouping by the 19 Vehicle Models with All 
Injury Levels Including No Injury, and Striking and Struck Vehicles 
    Without average    With average  
 All recalls    Hazard recalls   All recalls    Hazard recalls  
Variables    
Rec_Rate  -.1053  (.0713) -   -.1163 (.0712) -  
Rec_Rate_H  -   -.1676 (.1020)  -  -.1495 (.1022) 
Strike -    -   -.9995 (.4069)**  -.9579 (.4082)** 
Male -    -   -.8387 (.3876)**  -.8305 (.3878)** 
Age 16 to 25  -    -   1.6933 (.2940)***  1.6965 (.2925)*** 
Age 26 to 35  -    -   .0273 (.4393)  .0389 (.4390) 
Age 36 to 49  -    -   .3189 (.4239)  .2926 (.4237) 
Design  change .1380  (.0355)*** .1341 (.0357)*** .1410 (.0359)***  .1369 (.0360)*** 
Vintage 1.1131  (.2822)***  1.1392 (.2863)***  .7942 (.2749)***  .8128 (.2796)*** 
Sales  .4661  (.0361)*** .4597 (.0363)***  .4090 (.0326)*** .4047 (.0331)*** 
Sales square  -.0159  (.0018)***  -.0156 (.0018)*** -.0141 (.0016)***  -.0139 (.0017)*** 
Constant 2.8033  (.2368)***  2.8240 (.2344)*** 3.5952 (.3961)***  3.5835 (.3953)*** 
Num.  of  obs.  247  247  247  247  
2 R   0.7612  0.7603  0.8545  .8542  
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimation also includes a battery of year dummies (not shown).  
 
 
Table 7.B. Synthetic Panel Data Model—Grouping by the 19 Vehicle Models with 
All Injury Levels including “No Injury,” and Striking Vehicles Only 
  
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimation also include a battery of year dummies (not shown). 
    Without average    With average  
 All recalls    Hazard recalls    All recalls    Hazard recalls  
Variables     
Rec_Rate -.1018  (.0709)  -   -.1573 (.0750)**  -  
Rec_Rate_H -    -.1469 (.1018)  -   -.1983 (.1052)* 
Male -    -   -1.0074 (.3118)***  -1.0485 (.3117)***
Age 16 to 25  -    -   1.4239 (.2547)***  1.2909 (.2647)***
Age 26 to 35  -    -   .0628 (.3363)  .0647 (.3369) 
Age 36 to 49  -    -   .3967 (.3679)  .4124 (.3664) 
Design 
Change  .1608 (.0353)***  .1571 (.0356)*** .1497 (.0374)***  .1476 (.0369)***
Vintage .9084  (.2836)***  .9210 (.2883)*** .5988 (.2826)**  .6440 (.2867)** 
Sales .4901  (.0366)***  .4848 (.0369)*** .4159 (.0338)***  .4210 (.0349)***
Sales square  -.0172  (.0018)***  -.0169 (.0018)*** -.0145 (.0017)***  -.0146 (.0017)***
Constant  2.1020 (.2447)*** 2.1225 (.2421)*** 2.5606 (.3077)***  2.5661 (.3161)***
Num. of obs.  247    247 247   247
2 R   0.7282   0.7268 0.8347   0.826059 
 
Table 7.C. Synthetic Panel Data Model—Grouping by the 19 Vehicle Models with 
Injury Related Accidents Only, and Striking Vehicles Only 
 
    Without average    With average  
 All recalls    Hazard recalls    All recalls    Hazard recalls  
Variables  
Rec_Rate -.2425  (.1044)**  -   -.2801 (.0960)***  -     
Rec_Rate_H  -    -.3746 (.1577)**  -   -.3611   (.1387)***  
Male  -    -   .4868 (.2061)**  .4888   (.2071)**  
Age 16 to 25  -    -   1.7586 (.2349)***  1.7547   (.2351)***  
Age 26 to 35  -    -   1.2402 (.2582)***  1.2026   (.2600)***  
Age 36 to 49  -    -   .9450 (.2599)***  .9371   (.2618)***  
Design 
Change  .2186 (.0520)***  .2105 (.0521)*** .1677 (.0471)***  .1596  (.0473)***  
Vintage  .3295  (.4118) .4019 (.4170) .3607 (.3671) .3992    (.3722)   
Sales  .5069  (.0524)***  .4961 (.0528)*** .4248 (.0441)***  .4178   (.0448)***  
Sales square  -.0180  (.0026)***  -.0174 (.0026)*** -.0154 (.0022)***  -.0150   (.0022)***  
Constant  .9748  (.3425)***  .9950 (.3398)**  .2940 (.2994)  .3121   (.2998)  
Num. of obs.  247    247 247   247   
2 R   .6463   .6440 .7955   0.7921   
  
 Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimation also include a battery of year dummies (not shown) 
  
 
 Table 7.D. Synthetic Panel Data Model—Grouping by the 19 Vehicle Models 
with No Injury Related Accidents Only, and Striking Vehicles Only 
 
    Without average    With average  
 All recalls    Hazard recalls    All recalls    Hazard recalls  
Variables  
Rec_Rate -.1186  (.0802)  -   -.1769 (.0857)**  -  
Rec_Rate_H -    -.1990 (.1151)* -   -.2498 (.1205)** 
Male -    -   -.8231 (.3482)**  -.8758 (.3491)** 
Age 16 to 25  -    -   1.3719 (.2704)***  1.2652 (.2802)***
Age 26 to 35  -    -   .0318 (.3754)  .0347 (.3764) 
Age 36 to 49  -    -   .3923 (.4119)  .4002 (.4108) 
Design change  .1470  (.0340)***  .1422 (.0402)*** .1375 (.0427)***  .1340 (.0422)***
Vintage  1.0982 (.3176)*** 1.1246 (.3220)*** .8221 (.3160)***  .8741 (.3208)***
Sales .4944  (.0406)***  .4848 (.0407)*** .4171 (.0369)***  .4180 (.0382)***
Sales square  -.0173  (.0020)***  -.0169 (.0020)*** -.0146 (.0019)***  -.0145 (.0019)***
Constant  1.6619 (.2663)*** 1.6999 (.2619)*** 2.0585 (.3320)*** 2.0825 (.3406)***
Num. of obs.  247    247 247   247
2 R   .7232   .7221 .8109   .8051
  
 Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimation also include a battery of year dummies (not shown). 
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Table 8. Number of Accidents in Each Group in Each Year 
  
Group  no.  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1    293 320 274 214 215 221 200 246 260 310 320 437 429 387 
2    618 589 510 390 438 479 492 474 501 502 458 725 634 613 
3    335 345 446 459 535 615 561 523 530 573 542 799 760 781 
4    190  163  118  88 84 77 73 96 93 74 82  149  148  175 
5    491 450 413 416 426 467 428 429 348 444 421 681 720 633 
6    145  80 76 65 68 65 71 87 86 86 70  147  147  132 
7    183  129  147  80 91  113  90 97 70 92 52 37 23 18 
8    264 273 295 285 313 399 382 421 374 467 466 742 708 738 
9    218 167 216 212 250 295 261 291 327 371 314 513 488 501 
10    34  35  21  11  141 213 299 394 321 367 389 750 749 644 
11   295 301 347 344 272 333 331 302 314 329 215 276 248 233 
12   193 255 325 262 316 507 476 443 412 488 484 717 705 695 
13    51  76  93  76  94  113  92  117 101 108 125 195 175 163 
14   165 216 264 240 220 352 355 303 362 342 264 507 469 396 
15   154 152 206 216 254 375 394 410 394 376 440 734 723 645 
16    - - - - - -  71  151  182  252  212  258  379  377 
17    - - - - - - - - -  168  185  181  235  250 
18   121 106 109 106 120 129 142 104 118 116 108 424 175 181 
19    -  -  -  -  144 195 232 190 250 235 236 420 422 401 




 Note: Total number of observations is 74,806, which is equal to the number of observations in Table 4.  
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 Table 9. Estimation of the Effect of Recalls on Accidents: All Recalls  
  
    Striking + struck    Striking only    Striking only    Striking only  
   all injury levels    all injury levels    injury only    no injury only  
Rec_Rate -.0999  (.0331)***  -.0788 (.0448)* -.1639 (.0571)***  -.0523 (.0511)
      
Strike .3009  (.0474)***  - -   -
      
Male .1046  (.0474)**  .1487 (.0694)** -.1883 (.0741)**  .2917 (.0686)***
      
Age 16 to 25  .2350  (.0670)***  .3958 (.0981)*** .3750 (.1048)***  .4327 (.0970)***
      
Age 26 to 35  .1450  (.0670)**  .1985 (.0981)** .2202 (.1048)**  .2234 (.0970)**
      
Age 36 to 49  .2074  (.0670)***  .2115 (.0981)** .1905 (.1048)*  .2211 (.0970)**
      
Design 
change  .1289 (.0165)***  .1664 (.0223)*** .1487 (.0284)*** .1410 (.0255)***
      
Vintage 1.0928  (.1365)***  .9641 (.1849)*** .4367 (.2354)*  .9655 (.2109)***
      
Sales .4980  (.0182)***  .5332 (.0247)*** .4174 (.0314)***  .5324 (.0281)***
      
Sales_Square -.0172  (.0009)***  -.0189 (.0012)*** -.0142 (.0015)***  -.0188 (.0013)***
      
Mustang 1.1827  (.1503)***  1.4818 (.2191)*** 1.4305 (.2364)***  1.4053 (.2184)***
      
Escort .7378  (.1478)***  .8937 (.2160)*** 1.1269 (.2317)***  .7949 (.2143)***
      
Accord .8092  (.1478)***  .9204 (.2160)*** 1.0205 (.2316)***  .9067 (.2143)***
      
Century .3949  (.1508)***  .4946 (.2197)** .3797 (.2373)  .4053 (.2192)*
      
Cavalier .6818  (.1471)***  .8134 (.2151)*** 1.0537 (.2302)***  .7213 (.2131)***
      




 .9195  
  
(.1592)***  
 1.0892   
(.2303)***   .9139 
 





        
Civic    .7866    (.1471)***    .9449  (.2151)***  1.1320   (.2303)***    .8585  (.2131)*** 
          
Corolla    .7224    (.1475)***    .8625  (.2156)***  1.0483   (.2311)***    .7482  (.2138)*** 
          
Cherokee    .1734    (.1482)    .2760   (.2165)   .4625   (.2325)**    .2783   (.2150) 
          
Sentra    1.0731    (.1491)***   1.2012  (.2176)***  1.2835   (.2341)***  1.1022  (.2165)*** 62 
 
        
 Taurus    .5087    (.1483)***    .6163  (.2166)***   .7053   (.2326)***    .5954  (.2152)*** 
          
 Sable    .7953    (.1529)***    .9384  (.2224)***   .8441   (.2412)***    .8351  (.2227)*** 
          
 GrandAM    .7159    (.1475)***    .8304  (.2157)***   .8594   (.2311)***    .8044  (.2139)*** 
        
 Camry    .4981    (.1474)***    .6083  (.2155)***   .7667   (.2309)***    .5531  (.2137)*** 
          
 Altima    1.0891    (.1517)***   1.1960  (.2227)***  1.1868   (.2418)***  1.1242  (.2231)*** 
          
 Intrepid    .9555    (.1564)***   1.0261  (.2268)***   .7221   (.2479)***  1.0860  (.2284)*** 
          
 LeSabre    .2887    (.1499)*    .3796   (.2186)*   .2699   (.2356)    .3451   (.2178) 
          
 Constant    -1.2989    (.1801)***   -1.3236  (.2498)***  -1.628
5 
 (.2964)***   -1.778
7 
(.2688)*** 
Num. of obs.    3952    1976    1976    1976  
# of groups    304    152    152    152  
 
2 R :within    0.4467    0.4763    0.3426    0.3908  
 
2 R :between    0.7402    0.7479    0.7270    0.7605  
 
2 R :overall    0.6345    0.6535    0.5734    0.6237  
  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The vehicle model Dodge Caravan is the omitted 
model. Estimation also includes a battery of highly significant year dummies (not shown). 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (OLS vs. RE):  
 
2  (1)= 3918.28, P-value = 0.000 for column (1)  
 
2  (1)= 2189.26, P-value = 0.000 for column (2)  
 
2  (1)= 1300.88, P-value = 0.000 for column (3)  
 
















Table 10. Estimation of the Effect of Recalls on Accidents: Hazard Recalls 
  
    Striking + struck    Striking only    Striking only    Striking only  
   all injury levels    all injury levels   injury only    no injury only  
                   
 Rec_Rate_H    -.1485   (.0471)***   -.1140  (.0638)
*  
 -.1953  (.0813)**   -.0578  (.0728)  
                   
 Strike    .3009   (.0474)***    -       -       -     
                   
 Male    .1046    (.0474)**    .1487  (.0694)
**  
 -.1883  (.0741)**    .2917   (.0686)*** 
                   
 Age 16 to 25    .2350    .0670)***    .3958  (.0981)
***  
 .3750  (.1048)***    .4327   (.0970)*** 
                   
 Age 26 to 35    .1450    (.0670)**    .1985  (.0981)
**  
 .2201   (.1048)**    .2234   (.0970)**  
                   
 Age 36 to 49    .2074   (.0670)***    .2115  (.0981)
**  
 .1905   (.1048)*    .2211   (.0970)**  
                   
 Design change    .1260    .0165)***    .1641  (.0224)
***  
 .1446  (.0285)***    .1398   (.0255)*** 
                   
 Vintage    1.1270    .1384)***    .9890  (.1874)
***  
 .4609   (.2388)*    .9702   (.2138)*** 
                   
 Sales    .4951    .0184)***    .5312  (.0249)
***  
 .4166  (.0317)***    .5325   (.0284)*** 
                   
 Sales_Square    -.0170   (.0009)***   -.0188  (.0012)
***  
 -.0141  (.0015)***    -.0188   (.0014)*** 
               
 Mustang    1.1935   (.1501)***   1.4908  (.2189)
***  
 1.4540  (.2360)***    .4133   (.2181)*** 
                   
 Escort    .7406   (.1477)***    .8965  (.2159)
***  
 1.1399  (.2315)***    .7998   (.2142)*** 
                   
 Accord    .8101   (.1478)***    .9218  (.2159)
***  
 1.0320  (.2316)***    .9114   (.2142)*** 
                   
 Century    .3886   (.1509)***    .4902  (.2198)
**  
 .3775   (.2375)    .4054   (.2194)*  
                   64 
 
 Cavalier    .6786   (.1471)***    .8114  (.2151)
***  
 1.0562  (.2303)***    .7228   (.2132)*** 
                   
 Marquis    .3534    (.1525)**    .5074  (.2219)
**  
 .4314   (.2406)*    .4678   (.2221)**  
 
 Cougar  
 












 1.0307   
 (.2326)*** 
                   
 Civic    .7793    .1472)***    .9397  (.2152)
***  
 1.1274  (.2304)***    .8578   (.2133)*** 
                   
 Corolla    .7235   (.1475)***    .8640  (.2156)
***  
 1.0588  (.2310)***    .7523   (.2138)*** 
                   
 Cherokee    .1724    (.1482)    .2757   .2165)   .4692   (.2325)**    .2812   (.2150)  
                   
 Sentra    1.0733   (.1491)***    .2017  (.2176)
***  
 1.2893  (.2341)***   1.1046   (.2165)*** 
                   
 Taurus    .5023   (.1484)***    .6118  (.2167)
***  
 .7029  (.2328)***    .5954   (.2153)*** 
                   
 Sable    .7943   (.1529)***    .9366  (.2224)
***  
 .8491  (.2413)***    .8377   (.2227)*** 
                   
 GrandAM    .7175   (.1475)***    .8322  (.2156)
***  
 .8705  (.2310)***    .8088   (.2138)*** 
                   
 Camry    .4925   (.1475)***    .6145  (.2156)
***  
 .7671   .2311)***    .5541   (.2138)*** 
                   
 Altima    1.0999   (.1529)***   1.2050  (.2224)
***  
 1.2120  (.2413)***   1.1330   (.2227)*** 
                   
 Intrepid    .9553   (.1564)***   1.0263  (.2268)
***  
 .7278  (.2479)***   1.0884   (.2284)*** 
                   
 LeSabre    .2959    (.1497)*    .3854  (.2184)
*  
 .2905   (.2352)    .3525   (.2174)  
                   
 Constant    -1.3024   (.1799)***   1.3274  (.2496)
***  
-1.6503 (.2963)***    -1.7872   (.2686)*** 
 Num. of obs.    3952    1976    1976    1976  
 Num. of groups    304    152    152    152  
 
2 R :within    0.4468    0.4763    0.3417    0.3906  65 
 
 
2 R :between    0.7402    0.7479    0.7270    0.7605  
 
2 R :overall    0.6345    0.6535    0.5730    0.6236  
  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The Dodge Caravan is the omitted model. 
Estimation also includes a battery of highly significant year dummies (not shown). 
 Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (OLS vs. RE):  
 
2  (1)= 3919.48, P-value = 0.000 for column (1)  
 
2  (1)= 2189.42, P-value = 0.000 for column (2)  
 
2  (1)= 1298.10, P-value = 0.000 for column (3)  
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Table 11. Estimation of the Effect of Recalls on Accidents Domestic vs. Foreign Recalls 
 
  
    Striking vehicles only, and all injury levels  
    All recalls    Domestic recalls    Foreign recalls  
               
 Rec_Rate    -.0788    (.0448)*   -.1248   (.0607)**   -.1006    (.0593)* 
        
 Male    .1487    (.0694)**   .2219   (.0909)**   -.0089    (.0634) 
        
 Age 16 to 25    .3958   (.0981)***   .1629   (.1286)   .8986    (.0896)*** 
        
 Age 26 to 35    .1985    (.0981)**   .0064   (.1286)   .6137    (.0896)*** 
        
 Age 36 to 49    .2115    (.0981)**   .1092   (.1286)   .4322    (.0896)*** 
        
 Design Change    .1664   (.0223)***   .1380  (.0299)***   .1145    (.0313)*** 
        
 Vintage    .9641   (.1849)***   2.0111  (.2638)***   -.2324    (.2416) 
        
 Sales    .5332   (.0247)***   .6710  (.0332)***   .3248    (.0316)*** 
        
 Sales_Square    -.0189   (.0012)***   -.0234  (.0016)***   -.0124    (.0016)*** 
        
 Mustang    1.4818   (.2191)***   1.8191  (.2402)***   -    
        
 Escort    .8937   (.2160)***   .8733  (.2348)***   -    
        
 Accord    .9204   (.2160)***   -     -    
        
 Century    .4946    (.2197)**   .8701  (.2415)***   -    
        
 Cavalier    .8134   (.2151)***   .8165  (.2332)***   -    
        
 Marquis    .5001    (.2222)**   .9402  (.2455)***   -    
        
 Cougar    1.0892   (.2303)***   1.7298  (.2595)***   -    
        
 Civic    .9449   (.2151)***   -     -.1760    (.1125) 
        
 Corolla    .8625   (.2156)***   -     -.3494    (.1150)*** 
        
 Cherokee    .2760    (.2165)   .3497   (.2356)   -    
        
 Sentra    1.2012   (.2176)***   -     -.2496    (.1197)** 
        67 
 
 Taurus    .6163   (.2166)***   .5171   (.2362)**   -    
        
 Sable    .9384   (.2224)***   1.3733  (.2458)***   -    
        
 GrandAM    .8304   (.2157)***   .9404  (.2341)***   -    
        
 Camry    .6083   (.2155)***   -     -.3557    (.1092)*** 
        
 Altima    1.1960   (.2227)***   -     -.3601    (.1298)*** 
        
 Intrepid    1.0261   (.2268)***   1.4116  (.2488)***   -    
        
 LeSabre    .3796    (.2186)*   .6909  (.2393)***   -    
        
 Constant   -1.3236   (.2498)***   -2.6122  (.3199)***   1.5567    (.2397)*** 
  





 Num of Groups    152   104   48 
 
2 R :within    0.4763   0.4798   0.6299 
 
2 R :between    0.7479   0.7362   0.8390 
 
2 R :overall    0.6535   0.6433   0.7226 
  
  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The vehicle models Dodge Caravan and Honda 
Accord are the omitted models. Estimation also include a battery of highly significant year 
dummies (not shown). 
 Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (OLS vs. RE):  
 
2  (1)= 2189.26, P-value = 0.000 for column (1)  
 
2  (1)= 1541.16, P-value = 0.000 for column (2)  
 
2  (1)= 266.55, P-value = 0.000 for column (3)  
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 Table 12. The Effect of Correcting Defects  
 
  
    Without hazard    With hazard 
Variables              
        
 Correction rate    -.0048   (.0019)**   -.0046    (.0018)** 
   






(.0000001)***   -.00000049  
 
(.0000001)*** 
 Size_Recall    .0212   (.0265)   .0218    (.0261) 
 Size_Square    -.0205   (.0118)*   -.0217    (.0118)* 
 Recalls_After    -.0431   (.0248)*   -.0443    (.0234)* 
   
 Hazard    -     -.0995    (.0711) 
   
 Ford    -.2998   (.1075)***   -.2832    (.1209)** 
 GM    -.5308   (.1154)***   -.5211    (.1234)*** 
 Chrysler    -.6196   (.0890)***   -.6076    (.0984)*** 
 Toyota    -.5701   (.0901)***   -.5813    (.1030)*** 
 Honda    -.4087   (.1034)***   -.4014    (.1206)*** 
   
 Year_1988    -.3365   (.1034)***   -.3711    (.0983)*** 
 Year_1989    -.7306   (.1465)***   -.7488    (.1397)*** 
 Year_1990    -.3844   (.1309)***   -.4029    (.1025)*** 
 Year_1991    -.1944   (.0943)**   -.2685    (.1045)** 
 Year_1992    -.2843   (.1151)**   -.2978    (.1210)** 
 Year_1993    -.1662   (.1616)   -.1515    (.1616) 
 Year_1994    -.2662   (.2250)   -.2749    (.2176) 
 Year_1995    -.5608   (.1175)***   -.5863    (.1239)*** 
 Year_1996    -.2957   (.0997)***   -.2864    (.0988)*** 
 Constant    4.9222   (.1407)***   4.9855    (.1554)*** 
   
 
2 R     0.8797   0.8831 
 Num of Obs.    87   87 
  
  
 Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Nissan is the omitted car maker.  
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Table A1. Variable Definitions 
 
  
 Variable    Description  
     
 Dependent variable:     
 Acc_Type    Number of accidents of a composite type  
 Ln_Acc_Type    The natural logarithm of Acc_Type  
 Acc_Type_NI    Number of accidents of a composite type with no injury  
 Ln_Acc_Type_NI    The natural logarithm of Acc_Type_NI  
 Acc_Type_I    Number of accidents of a composite type with injury  
 Ln_Acc_Type_I    The natural logarithm of Acc_Type_I  
    
 Driver characteristics     
 Male    1 if driver is male  
 Strike    1 if the vehicle strikes other vehicles or objects  
 Age 16 to 25    1 if driver’s age is fewer than 26  
 Age 26 to 35    1 if driver’s age is between 26 and 35  
 Age 26 to 49    1 if driver’s age is between 36 and 49  
 Age 50+    1 if driver’s age is 50 or higher 
    
 Vehicle characteristics    
 Design Change    1 if there is any substantial design change within the last 5 years  
 Vintage    The ratio of current and last year’s vehicle stocks to total 5 year stock  
 Sales    The number of vehicles sold in the previous 4 years in 100,000s of units 
 Sales_Square    The square of the sales  
 Mustang    1 if the vehicle model is Ford Mustang  
 ...............†    Other vehicle models  
    
 Recall characteristics     
 Rec_Rate    The ratio of units recalled to units sold  
    in the previous 4 years 
 Rec_Rate_H    The ratio of high hazard units recalled to units sold  
    in the previous 4 years 
    
 Other characteristics     
 Year_1988 to 2001    Year Dummies for the 1988 to 2001 period  
    
  
† Other vehicle dummies. A total of 19 vehicle models are included in our estimation 
sample. 
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Table A2. Variable Definition for Correction Rate Estimation 
 
  
 Variable    Description  
    
 Dependent variable:     
 Ln_Ave_Acct†   The natural logarithm of the average number of accidents within 3 years 
    
 Independent variables:  
 Correction Rate    Correction rates of a recall  i, 18 months after issuance 
 Ave_Sales †    Vehicles’ Sales (Units: 1,000 vehicles)  
 Ave_Sales_Square    The square of the sales  
 Size_Recall    The size of a recall (in vehicle Units: 100,000)  
 Size_Square    The square of the size of the recall  
 Recalls_After    The number of recalls after the recall  i within 3 years  
 Hazard    Whether the recall was category A or B (Hazardous)  
 Ford    Manufacturer dummy  
 .....‡    Other manufacturer dummies  
 Year_1988 to 2001    Year dummies for the 1988 to 2001 period  
  
 
  † When a recall covers many vehicle models we sum them up. 





 Table A3. Vehicle Models  
 
 
Variable  Vehicle models  Variable  Vehicle models 
Mustang  Ford Mustang  Accord  Honda Accord 
Escort  Ford Escort  Civic  Honda Civic 
Century  Buick Century  Corolla  Toyota Corolla 
Cavalier  Chevrolet Cavalier  Sentra  Nissan Sentra 
Altima  Nissan Altima  Camry  Toyota Camry 
Marquis Mercury  Marquis  Intrepid Dodge  Intrepid 
Cougar Mercury  Cougar  LeSabre Buick  LeSabre 
Cherokee  Jeep Cherokee  Caravan  Dodge Caravan 
Taurus Ford  Taurus     
Sable Mercury  Sable     





Table A4. Estimation of the Effect of Recalls on Accidents: Hazard Recalls Specification 




    Striking + struck    Striking only    Striking only    Striking only  
   all injury levels    all injury levels    injury only    no injury only  
               
 






-.0668   (.0632)   -.1865 
 





        
 Strike    .3010  (.0474)***    -     -      -   
          
 Male    .1046   (.0474)**    .1487   (.0694)**   -.1883   (.0741)**    .2917  (.0686)*** 
          
 Age 16 to 25    .2351  (.0670)***    .3958  (.0981)***   .3750  (.1048)***    .4327  (.0970)*** 
          
 Age 26 to 35    .1450   (.0670)**   .1984   (.0981)**   .2201   (.1048)**   .2233   (.0970)** 
          
 Age 36 to 49    .2073    (.0670) 
***  
 .2114   (.0981)**   .1905   (.1048)*   .2211   (.0970)** 
          
Design change    -       -     -      -   
          
 Vintage    -       -     -      -   
          
 Sales    .4443  (.0176)***    .4853  (.0240)***   .3935  (.0302)***    .4880  (.0272)*** 
          
 Sales_Square   -.0151  (.0009)***   -.0171  (.0012)***   -.0133 (.0015)***    -.0171 (.0013)*** 
          
 Constant   -.4143  (.1525)***   -.4932   (.2140)** -1.1918 (.2455)***    -.9906 (.2243)*** 
          
 Num. of obs.    3952    1976   1976    1976 
 # of groups    304    152   152    152 
 
2 R :within    0.4300    0.4551   0.3317    0.3755 
 
2 R :between    0.7402    0.7479   0.7270    0.7605 
 
2 R :overall    0.6282    0.6459   0.5689    0.6179 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The Dodge Caravan is the omitted model. 












1 The NHTSA estimated the total economic cost of motor vehicle crashes in the year 2000 as being more than 
$230.6 billion in terms of the present value of lifetime costs (NHTSA, 2002). Various regulations, such as the 
seat belt regulation and speed limits, have been put in place to reduce these costs. Viscusi, Vernon, and 
Harrington (2000, Ch. 22) provide a detailed discussion of the many regulations, other than recalls, affecting 
the automobile industry. The number of vehicle accidents in the United States has been fairly stable in the last 
decade going from a high of a bit more than 6.7 million in 1996 to just below 6 million in 2008. In that year 
37,261 people were killed in the 5,811,000 police-reported motor vehicle traffic crashes. More than 2.35 
million people were injured and 4,146,000 crashes involved property damage only (NHTSA, Traffic Safety 
Facts, 2010). Most accidents were likely caused by drivers' mistakes or misbehavior. However, it cannot be 
underestimated that vehicle defects may play a role in causing accidents. 
2 Peters (2005) discusses the phenomenal increase in the number of recalls in the last few years and blames 
the increased complexity of the cars and also the changes in the regulatory environment that came to be at the 
beginning of this decade with the passing of the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and 
Documentation Act, which requires more communication between manufacturers and the government 
regarding potential safety issues. Another possible explanation is connected with the fact that nowadays more 
vehicle models use the same parts, and the effect of one defect on the safety of many vehicle models is more 
common than ever. 
3 Evans is the president of Science Serving Society, International Traffic Medicine Association (ITMA). He 
was affiliated with GM for over 30 years and is the author of “Traffic Safety and the Driver'' and more 
recently, “Traffic Safety.'' He said, “My best guess is zero. I believe that fixes due to vehicle recalls have 
saved zero, or close to zero lives. However, driving to have them attended to imposes the risk of death 
associated with additional travel—so, arguably, recalls increase traffic deaths and certainly increase fuel use, 
etc. It seems to me that there ought to be much stronger evidence on the proposers of such policies to show 
evidence that some good flows from them” (email correspondence with the authors, April 11, 2003). 
4 Mr. McDonald actually contacted us when he was about to complete his book when he became aware of an 
early working paper of ours that had some of the ideas and discussions we present here. He cited our working 
paper in his book, but did not present any discussion of our findings or conclusions. The concerns about the 
fact that the definition of a defect could be too broad and could lead to costly recalls that have no 
consequences for safety is not new, and is already discussed in some detail in Tobin (1982) and a number of 
references therein. 
5 The need to use this methodology to control for the unobserved heterogeneity, likely to explain a great deal 
of the variation in the number of accidents of different vehicle models, prevents us from using the sample 
weights in the accidents data (which is cross-sectional in nature, resulting from police reports collected in a 
given calendar year) that we use in the paper. The reason for this is that those weights only control for the 
stratified sampling by location of the accident, but cannot be used to make accidents by particular vehicle 
models or particular drivers, representative at the national level.  
6 The letter we refer to was sent by Stephen L. Oesch, Senior Vice President, IIHS to President Jeffrey W. 
Runge, M.D., Administrator, NHTSA. It can be downloaded from the Internet following the link to the 2001 
petition at  / / / . . // : petitions laws org iihs www http  and states “The Insurance Institute for Highway 
Safety hereby petitions the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to amend the Defect 
and Noncompliance Reports (49 CFR 573) to require that vehicle manufacturers supply NHTSA with the 
vehicle identification number (VIN) for each defective or noncompliant vehicle.” 
7 The office of the then California state senator sent a press release on August 30, 2005, made available to us 
by e-mail, which quotes the senator. She stated, “Car makers foot the bill for the recall repairs, so obviously 
it's best for their bottom line if people don't find out about them and don't bring their cars in to get repaired. 
That's why GM opposed the bill.” She then continues, “To argue that giving people more information would 
somehow reduce the odds they'll get their car repaired is just laughable. The bill would have increased the 
likelihood that people will find out about a recall and get their car repaired free of charge, which is precisely 
why consumer groups supported the measure and why GM worked so hard to kill it.” 
8 Interestingly, these policy suggestions are in line with early recommendations by researchers (Tobin, 1982) 
regarding the possibility of having states help prevent vehicles from passing motor vehicle inspections if they 73 
 
 
are not repaired, or prevent the transferring of ownership of vehicles not yet repaired. 
9 See Grabowski and Vernon (1983, and the discussion of that work in Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington 
(1992, Chapter 23), in particular Figure 23.2., in the context of regulating pharmaceutical products. More 
recently, Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson (1990) present a theoretical discussion about ex-ante vs. ex-post safety 
regulation, and Marino (1997) presents a model of recalls with imperfect monitoring that shows that recalls 
can be considered a blend of ex-ante and ex-post safety regulation. 
10 As of late 2010 a bill is being considered in Congress that would allow the NHTSA to speed up the process 
of mandatory recalls, which can now take months. In addition, they are considering requiring car 
manufacturers to install devices that would record what happened during an accident, similar to what is in 
place in airplanes. See “Highway safety agency wants more auto recall power,” AP Press, May 6, 2010. 
11 Information for this process can be obtained from the NHTSA. Details are described in its homepage, 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/. 
12 Ward's Automotive Yearbook from 1983 to 2002. These are model year numbers, starting from September 
in the previous year. 
13 Direct costs are the ones that are used to correct the defects: repair costs, advertising costs, and so on. 
Indirect costs are the ones that are incurred through the financial and the goods markets due to recalls. 
14 This general representativeness provides some external validity for the results we present and the policy 
suggestions linked to the results. Notice, however, as discussed in the introduction, that we use the raw data 
in our estimates, and do not use the regional weights provided to make the data representative of the US, due 
to the fact that the pseudo-panel construction prevents us from assigning a weight to each accident, since now 
the level of observation is a composite-type in a given year. 
15 Bae and Benítez-Silva (in press) use more recent accident data in their study of the link between recalls and 
the severity of accidents, with results very much in line with those presented in this paper. Many recalls take 
some time to be issued, and therefore using more recent data can face serious right-censoring problems. 
16 In fact, each accident has different accidental harm measured by severity, and we also have a measure of 
whether personal injury occurred. Therefore, it does not strictly reflect the true value of the harm for the type. 
But if we use a weighted value using information on severity for the composite type, then the estimation is 
likely to be an error-ridden one. Bae and Benítez-Silva (2010) present a “severity model,” using only 
cross-sectional data. The results of that research show that recalls reduce the severity of injury to drivers. 
17 Recently, a California jury awarded $15 million in a wrongful death lawsuit involving the death of two 
people while driving a vehicle rented from Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company, which was subject to a recall 
and was not fixed.  The company knew all too well it was supposed to be taken to the dealer, yet still rented 
the vehicle to people. See the news section corresponding to June 24, 2010 in 
/ . . // : com ys uryattorne ersonalinj pensacolap www http . 
18 See the discussion of reforms to Section 30120 of Title 49 of the United States Code, to make sure rental 
fleets, along with schools buses, and taxi fleets comply with the repairs linked to recalls, see 
htm secveh final gov dot ost testimony http . / / . . . // : . 
19 If the recall happened in the first 6 months of a particular year, the 3 years used include the year in which 
the recall was issued. Otherwise, include the 3 years following the recall. 
20 To exemplify how this key variable is computed, consider a recall by the Ford Motor company issued in 
1993 for its Mustang 1993 model year (NHTSA recall ID #: 93V159000). The number of vehicles affected 
was 4,100. From 1989 to 1992, 468,679 Mustangs were sold. Therefore, the recall value is
.0087 =
468,679





21 Following the recommendations from an anonymous referee we provide in the results section a sensitivity 
analysis in our specifications in which we remove two variables: Design Change and Vintage. We did this 
due to the variables’ possible endogeneity linked to the fact that they are likely good explanatory variables in 
the selection process of the observed accidents in the data, given that newer vehicles when involved in even 
small accidents are much more likely to report it to authorities. However, omitting them from the 
specification opens the door to possible omitted variable biases if these variables are likely to be correlated 
with the recall rates. Even if we did not remove these variables, by restricting attention to striking vehicles 74 
 
 
and restricting attention to accidents that lead to injuries (as we do in many of our specifications), this effect 
is likely ameliorated as also conjectured by the aforementioned referee. 
22 Moffitt (1993), Collado (1997), Girma (2000), McKenzie (2004), and Verbeek and Vella (2005) focus on 
the estimation and identification of dynamic models using a time series of repeated cross sections. The 
demands on the data by those types of models are considerably higher than in the linear pseudo-panel data 
model that we estimate. 
23 If we stop to consider the way we arrange the data from one of these cross sections, the empirical strategy 
presented in this section can be understood as trying to describe the evolution of the empirical distributions 
(densities) composed of the number of accidents in the different cells, where a cell is defined by a 
combination of driver and vehicle characteristics. This distribution(s) can in turn be understood as the 
reduced form derived from a structural model in which drivers make decisions regarding which vehicles to 
drive (buy), how to drive them, and which accidents to report when they have such a choice. Manufacturers 
make decisions regarding which vehicles to commercialize and how much pre-market testing to perform on 
their cars responding to the incentive structure set up by the government regarding recall initiation and report. 
The agents face a stochastic environment regarding road conditions, the behavior of other drivers, and tastes 
for certain vehicle types. Our econometric specifications can be thought of as trying to estimate the set of 
parameters that can better describe this reduced form distribution, and its evolution, and therefore should not 
carry a causal interpretation. 
24 We could use count data techniques to estimate our models. However, given that there are almost no zeros 
in our data set, the easier interpretation of the coefficients using standard moment condition methods, the 
appropriateness for inference of regression methods, and the fact that none of our main results change in any 
significant way, we have decided to report the results using standard panel data regression techniques. 
25 In all the tables that follow the level of significance of the coefficients presented is indicated by stars, with 
***, **, and *, representing significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
26 An alternative explanation is that newer cars are more likely to be driven by riskier drivers or be used as 
rental cars as suggested by an anonymous referee. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to separate the 
contribution of these different types of explanations to our result. We can, however, suggest that our 
explanations, while plausible, should be taken with caution. 
27 It is interesting, however, as suggested by an anonymous referee, to explore the sources of variation in our 
panel data, following the interesting work in agricultural economics by Mundlak, Larson, and Butzer (1999) 
and Mundlak, Butzer, and Larson (2008). Borrowing from their characterization, we can think of our random 
effects estimates as akin to the estimation of a production function of accidents (trying to describe the 
empirical distribution of accidents by their characteristics and over time), accounting for time variation and 
also variation across our composite types, where we estimate the effects of observed inputs (the controls of 
the characteristics of vehicles and drivers) and unobserved technology (the unobserved characteristics of 
drivers). In this context, we can actually estimate a panel data between composite-type estimator, where we 
only control for the year dummies and compare the results with the main models. In those estimates, available 
from the authors upon request, the key recall variable changes signs and turns positive and because we do not 
control for vehicle models, the recall rate captures the fact that the differences in accidents across composite 
types can be explained by the fact that models with more recalls also have more accidents, even if within a 
particular model, and over time, higher recalls predict declining accidents. In addition, drivers’ 
characteristics do not change almost at all from the random effects estimator, but the indicators of Design 
Change and the proportion of newer vehicles in the total vehicles on the road in the last 5 years (Vintage) also 
change signs. The between estimation also turns negative, so when comparing the variation in accidents 
across composite types, those linked to models that change designs and have a newer vehicle fleet happen in 
a smaller proportion. These results illuminate the variation in our synthetic panel data and provide some 
interesting support for our overall empirical strategy to identify the effects of recalls on accidents over time 
and across vehicle models, controlling for drivers' characteristics. 
28 Other specifications that separate domestic and foreign vehicles give similar results, and only when we 
focus in a small category of accidents do we observe any difference between the two types of vehicles, but 
even then they are not significant due to the large standard errors of those small sample specifications. 
29 The fairly strong relationship between the recall variable and the Vintage measure, and the link of the latter 
with the likelihood of an accident being reported to the police, reminds us of the tension between the 
consequences of multicollinearity vs. omitted variable biases in linear models. Our results regarding the 
parameter estimates of the recall and Vintage variable can be understood in light of the classical concept of 75 
 
 
concentration ellipsoid as presented in Malinvaud (1966), where due to their covariance structure, the 
separate effect of two independent variables on the dependent variable can only be precisely identified up to 
some combination of the two, in the direction of the large characteristic roots. For example, if from Table 10 
we re-estimate the four models presented in the columns but omit the recall rate measure, we obtain a table 
(not shown) akin to Table A.4 but with the Design Change and Vintage variable included. The coefficients on 
the vintage indicator are then reduced by a large fraction of the value of the omitted coefficient, suggesting 
the vintage variable erroneously captures the negative effect that recalls have on accidents, in the same way 
that the recall variable erroneously captures the positive effect of the Vintage (and Design Change) variable 
in Table A.4. As a fraction of the coefficients estimated, the changes in the recall variable due to the omission 
of the selection related variables (Design Change and Vintage), presented in Table A.4, are smaller than the 
changes in the Vintage variable due to the omission of the recall variable, because of the smaller standard 
deviation of the Vintage variable. While collinearity is clearly present in our preferred specification, it does 
not seem very severe given the significance of our parameter estimates, suggesting that the biases present in 
the simpler models is likely to be costlier than the effects of collinearity on the parameters of interest. 
30 Hause (2006) provides an up–to-date theoretical treatment of offsetting behavior geared towards empirical 
testing of this phenomenon. 
31 Low correction rates are also quite common in the recalls of many other products, as discussed, for 
example in Felcher (2003). 
32 As the investigation regarding the major recall of Ford Explorers linked to tire problems showed, the 
government was not collecting the appropriate information from manufacturers, and therefore the use of 
information by insurance companies was essentially impossible. 